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I. INTRODUCTION
The modern voting rights movement began with passage of the
Voting Rights Act of 19651 and was essentially black and southern. Today that movement, propelled by a series of congressional amendments
to the Act, favorable court decisions, and the concerted efforts of minority and civil rights communities, is multiracial and national in character. It is also having an increasingly profound impact on American
politics.
Although the 1965 Act had provisions that applied nationwide,2
Congress intentionally targeted seven states of the old Confederacy-Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, and portions of North Carolina-for the application of unique
and stringent measures described by the Supreme Court as the "heart
of the Act."3 The new measures suspended discriminatory literacy and
other tests which had been used to deny blacks the vote. The Act also
prohibited the affected jurisdictions from enacting any new discriminatory laws by requiring them for a period of five years to preclear all
4
changes in their election practices with federal officials.
1. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to
1973bb-1 (1982)) [hereinafter 1965 Act]. The Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964 also contained provisions prohibiting discrimination in voting. See Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No.
85-315, § 131, 71 Stat. 634, 637-38 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1982)); Civil Rights
Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, § 601, 74 Stat. 86, 90-93 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
1971, 1974 to 1974e (1982)); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 101, 78 Stat. 241, 24142 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1982)). They depended primarily upon time consuming litigation for enforcement, and consequently failed to achieve any significant minority voter
registration or office holding. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313-15 (1966). For a
discussion of the shortcomings of these earlier acts, see: Derfner, Racial Discriminationand the
Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523, 544-48 (1973); Van Alstyne, The Administration'sAnti-Literacy Test Bill: Wholly Constitutional but Wholly Inadequate, 61 MicH. L. REV. 805 (1963); and
Note, Federal Protection of Negro Voting Rights, 51 VA. L. REv. 1051, 1100-95 (1965).
2. E.g., 1965 Act, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. at 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982))
(a general prohibition on discrimination in voting); id. § 10(a)-(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1973h(a)-(c) (facilitating constitutional challenges to the use of poll taxes in state and local elections); id. §§ 11,
12(a)-(d), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973i-1973j (establishing criminal and civil sanctions for interference with
rights protected by the Act).
3. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 315.
4. 1965 Act, Pub. L. No. 89-110, §§ 4(a), 5, 79 Stat. at 438-39 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
1973b(a), 1973c (1982)). Preclearance could be obtained administratively by submitting a proposed
change to the Attorney General or by bringing a declaratory judgment action in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. In either case the submitting jurisdiction had the burden of proving that the proposed change would not have the purpose or effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156,
172, 185 (1980); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). Underscoring the controversial
nature of the new measures, in Katzenbach Justice Black charged that the Act was a "radical
degradation of state power" and created the impression that the affected southern states "are little
more than conquered provinces." Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 360 (Black, J., dissenting). Repeating
these charges in his dissenting opinion in Allen, Justice Black said that the preclearance require-
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Congress acted in this unprecedented manner because the targeted
states since the days of Reconstruction had systematically discriminated against blacks in voter registration, voting, and by adopting official policies of racial segregation in other areas of public and private
life.' Congress concluded that the prior method of redressing discrimination in voting through litigation on a case-by-case basis had failed
and that stringent new measures were needed to enforce the guarantees
of the fifteenth amendment.'
From this narrow, specialized, regional and racial focus of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the campaign for equal voting rights has spread.
Blacks, joined by Hispanics and Native Americans, have intensified the
fight for increased political participation and have taken voting rights
challenges to the cities of the North, the West, and the Southwest.7 As
ment was "reminiscent of old Reconstruction days when soldiers controlled the South and when
those States were compelled to make reports to military commanders of what they did." Allen, 393
U.S. at 595; see MacCoon, The Enforcement of the PreclearanceRequirement of Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 107 (1979); McDonald, The 1982 Extension of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: The Continued Need for Preclearance,51 TENN. L. REV. 1,
30-62 (1983); Motomura, Preclearance Under Section Five of the Voting Rights Act, 61 N.C.L.
REV. 189 (1983).

The Act also authorized the appointment of federal examiners to register qualified voters in
the covered jurisdictions and the appointment of federal poll watchers. 1965 Act, Pub. L. No. 89110, §§ 6(b)-9, 79 Stat. at 439-42 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973d-1973f (1982)). Section 3(c), the socalled "pocket trigger," was aimed at pockets of discrimination not otherwise covered by § 5 and
allowed a district court to require preclearance of voting changes in any jurisdiction to remedy a
violation of the fifteenth amendment. Id. § 3(c), 79 Stat. at 437-38 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c)
(1982)).
5. This history has been recorded in numerous places. See, e.g., J. FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY
TO FREEDOM (1967); V. KEY. SOUTHERN POLrICS IN STATE AND NATION (1949); P. LEWINSON, RACE,
CLASS AND PARTY: A HISTORY OF NEGRO SUFFRAGE AND WHITE POLmCS IN THE SOUTH (1965); V.
WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1966).
6. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308-09, 328 (holding the special provisions constitutional). The
coverage of the special provisions was tied to a jurisdiction's use of a discriminatory "test or device" for voting (for example, a literacy, education, or good character test), and low voter registration or turnout (defined as less than half of age eligible residents actually registered or voting in
the preceding presidential election). 1965 Act, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(b), 79 Stat. at 438 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1982)); see H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14, reprintedin 1965
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2437, 2445 [hereinafter 1965 U.S. CODE]; S. REP. No. 162, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE, supra, at 2508, 2552.
In addition to the southern states, coverage was extended to Alaska, three counties in Arizona,
one county in Idaho, and one county in Hawaii. 30 Fed. Reg. 9897, 14,505 (1965). All these jurisdictions, except Hawaii, immediately petitioned for, and were granted, "bailout" from coverage pursuant to § 4(a) of the 1965 Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a), by filing suits in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia and proving that they had not used a test or device within the
preceding five years with the purpose or effect of discriminating. See Apache County v. United
States, 256 F. Supp. 903 (D.D.C. 1966); Elmore County v. United States, No. 320-66 (D.D.C. Sept.
22, 1966); Alaska v. United States, No. 101-66 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 1966); see also S. REP. No. 295,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 n.4, reprintedin 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 774, 778 [hereinafter 1975 U.S. CODE].
7. See, e.g., Gomez v. City of Watsonville, 852 F.2d 1186 (9th Cir. 1988) (suit by Hispanics
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a result, more minorities are going to the polls, holding office, and helping to shape national policy. Since 1965, what has been unfolding is
nothing less than a quiet revolution in voting.
II.

INCREASED MINORITY VOTING AND OFFICE HOLDING

Prior to 1965 there were fewer than one hundred black elected officials in the southern states originally targeted by the Voting Rights Act,
and fewer than two hundred nationwide.8 As of January 1987 the number had grown to 2908 in the target states and 6892 nationwide.' Nonblack minorities have posted similar gains. Although statistics from preVoting Rights Act years are not generally available, today there are an
estimated 3360 elected officials of Latin American descent 0 and approximately 852 who are Native American (in nontribal offices).1"
Accurate registration figures are difficult to obtain, 2 but there is no
challenging at-large elections in Watsonville, Cal.); Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240 (5th
Cir. 1988) (suit by Mexican-Americans against method of electing city council); Buckanaga v. Sisseton Indep. School Dist., 804 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1986) (law suit by Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux involving at-large elections for South Dakota school district); Buchanan v. City of Jackson, 683 F.
Supp. 1515 (W.D. Tenn. 1988) (suit against at-large voting for city board of commissioners); McNeil v. City of Springfield, 658 F. Supp. 1015 (C.D. Ill. 1987) (challenging method of elections for
city commission); Windy Boy v. County of Big Horn, 647 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Mont. 1986) (challenge
by Crow and Northern Cheyenne to discriminatory at-large elections in Big Horn County, Mont.);
Campaign for a Progressive Bronx v. Black, 631 F. Supp. 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (suit on behalf of
Hispanic voters challenging registration procedures in Bronx County); Ketchum v. City Council,
630 F. Supp. 551 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (implementing a remedy for vote dilution in a suit by blacks and
Hispanics against the Chicago City Council).
8. See U.S. COMM'N ON Crvis RIGHTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 15 (1968) [hereinafter POLITICAL PARTICIPATION]; see also Hamilton, Political Access, Minority Participation,and the New
Normalcy, in MINORITY REPORT 12 (L. Dunbar ed. 1984).
9.

JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES, BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS: A NATIONAL ROSTER

(1988) [hereinafter NAT'L ROSTER 1988]. More than 80% of black elected officials hold municipal
or county offices; 23 serve in the Congress. Id.
10.

NALEO EDUCATION FUND, 1988 NATIONAL ROSTER OF HISPANIC ELECTED OFFICIALS [here-

inafter NALEO REPORT]. According to the NALEO Report, 69.4% of Hispanic elected officials
serve on school boards or hold municipal office; 120 serve in state legislatures and 11 in Congress.
Id.
11.

NATIONAL INDIAN YOUTH COUNCIL, INDIAN ELECTED OFFICIALS DIRECTORY (Nov. 1986). Of

Indian officeholders, more than 90% serve on school boards whose members generally are elected
by residents of the areas served by the schools or by parents of children in the schools; 49 Indians
serve in state level positions and one, Ben "Nighthorse" Campbell (D. Colo.), in Congress. Id.
12. Standard sources of voter registration data include the reports of the various secretaries
of state, the National Election Study (NES), prepared by the University of Michigan's Survey
Research Center after Presidential elections, and the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey
(Census Bureau/CPS), compiled from surveys following Presidential and midterm elections. All
these sources significantly inflate registration rates. The reports of the secretaries of state fail to
compensate for "deadwood"-registrants who have died or moved but who are still carried on the
rolls. One study estimates that the average deadwood registration for the country is between 15%
and 20%. See F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS DON'T VOTE 266 (1988). The same study
estimates that the NES is similarly inflated by 10% to 20%. Id. at 257. The Census Bureau/CPS is
unreliable because those surveyed (58,000 households in 1984 and 54,500 in 1986), particularly
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doubt that minority registration has increased substantially. The Census Bureau's Current Population Survey gives a rough indication of the
levels of increase in minority registration. According to the 1986 survey,
there were approximately 3,590,000 black registered voters in the seven
states originally targeted by the Voting Rights Act, about a quarter of
all registered voters.1 3 Even adjusting these figures for error, there has
been a dramatic increase since 1965, when the number of black registered voters stood at only 994,000.'
Similar increases in Hispanic and Native American registration
have been recorded in other parts of the country. The Southwest Voter
Research Institute reports that more than three million Hispanics are
registered in California, Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and Colorado,
and an additional two million are registered in other parts of the country. 5 Aggregate registration data for American Indians are not generally available because the racial identification of voters often is not
required by states, while survey research is difficult to conduct because
of language and cultural barriers and the remoteness of areas in which
Indians live. Nonetheless, surveys that have been conducted show substantial increases in registration among Indian tribes. According to the
Navajo Times, there was an increase in Navajo registration in New
Mexico and Utah from 11,500 in 1974 to 38,000 in 1976.16 In Big Horn
blacks and probably southerners, generally overreport their registration and voting. Id. at 257-59;
see also Abramson & Claggett, Race-Related Differences in Self-Reported and Validated Turnout, 46 J. POL. 719, 722-23 (1984); Katosh & Traugott, The Consequences of Validated and SelfReported Voting Measures, 45 PUB. OPINION Q. 519, 525 (1981).
The extent of the inflation of state and Census Buriau/CPS registration estimates was demonstrated during a challenge to Mississippi's restrictive registration laws. Mississippi State Chapter,
Operation PUSH v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. Miss. 1987). The state's figures indicated that
in 1984, 92.2% of the voting age population was registered, making Mississippi's registration rate
the highest in the Nation. Id. at 1264. The Census Bureau/CPS reported that 85.6% of the state's
black and 81.4% of its white voting age population was registered to vote. Id. at 1253. The court
concluded, however, on the basis of more reliable registration data developed by the plaintiffs from
returned jury questionnaires/summonses for the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Mississippi that only 54% of the state's black and 79% of its white age eligible population were actually on the voter rolls. Id. at 1255.
13. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE
ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 1986, at 25-28 (1987). The secretaries of state reported an even higher

number of black registered voters, 3,620,100. JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES, BLACK ELECTED
OFFICIALS: A NATIONAL ROSTER (1986) [hereinafter NAT'L ROSTER 1986].
14. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, supra note 8, at 12-13. In Mississippi, which traditionally had
the lowest rate of black voter registration in the southern states, less than 7% of age-eligible blacks
were on the voter rolls in 1965. Id. at 13. Today the figure stands at about 54%, or approximately
356,000 voters. Operation PUSH, 674 F. Supp. at 1255.
15. Interview with Robert Brischetto, Director, Southwest Voter Research Institute, in San
Antonio, Texas (Nov. 14, 1988).
16. Navajo Times, Nov. 13, 1980, cited in McCool, Indian Voting, in AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 105, 124 (V. DeLoria ed. 1985) [hereinafter AMERICAN INDIAN

POLICY].

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

1254

[Vol. 42:1249

County, Montana, where Crow and Northern Cheyenne comprise fortyone percent of the voting age population and where discrimination
against Indians in the political process has been severe, Indians and
whites now register at about the same rates.17
III.

AMENDMENTS TO THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF

1965

The convergence of a number of factors has contributed to the
growth in minority political participation. Most obvious among these is
the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Amendments to the Act in 1970 extended
(for five additional years) and nationalized the suspension of literacy
and other tests for voting. The amendments also increased the number
of jurisdictions subject to the preclearance requirement by including
the 1968 Presidential election in the coverage formula.1 8 In 1975, Congress made the suspension of literacy and other tests permanent. 9 It
also extended preclearance for an additional seven years, enlarged coverage of the Act by including the 1972 Presidential election in the coverage formula and extended protection for the first time to "language
minorities," defined as American Indians, Asian Americans, Alaskan
Natives and Hispanics.20
17. Windy Boy, 647 F. Supp. at 1004, 1017. Increased Indian registration also may be inferred from increased rates of voter turnout. For seven tribes in Arizona-Papago, Navajo, Hualapi, Hopi, Havasupai, Colorado, and Apache-voter turnout at reservation precincts rose from

11,789 in 1972 to 15,982 in 1980. McCool, supra note 16, in

AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY,

supra note

16, at 119-20.
18. Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1982)).
The added jurisdictions were: Kings and Bronx Counties in New York; Elmore County, Idaho;
election districts in Alaska; counties in Arizona, California, and Wyoming; and towns in Connecticut, New Hampshire, Maine, and Massachusetts. S. REP. No. 295, supra note 6, at 13, reprintedin
1975 U.S. CODE, supra note 6, at 774, 777-78.
19. Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 402 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1982)). The
original suspension of literacy tests and the subsequent nationwide ban were held constitutional in
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966), and Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 132
(1970).
20. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, sec. 207, § 14(c)(3), 89 Stat.
401, 402 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 19731(c)(3) (1982)) [hereinafter 1976 Act]. The term "test or
device" for purposes of § 5 coverage was amended to include English-only registration procedures
and elections where a single linguistic minority comprises more than 5% of the voting age population in the jurisdiction. Id. sec. 203, § 4(f)(3), 89 Stat. at 401-02 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1973b(f)(3)). Jurisdictions added to § 5 coverage include Alaska (which was "recaptured" after its
successful bailout from original coverage), Arizona, and various counties in California, Florida,
Michigan, South Dakota, Texas, North Carolina, Colorado, Idaho, and Hawaii. See 28 C.F.R. § 51
app. (1988). The 1975 amendments also provided that a jurisdiction must conduct bilingual elections and registration campaigns if a single language minority comprises greater than 5% of the
eligible voters, and the illiteracy rate within the language minority is higher than the national
average. 1975 Act, Pub. L. No. 94-73, sec. 203(b)-(c), 89 Stat. at 402-03 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1973aa-la (b), (c) (1982)); see City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 182 (1980) (holding the
1975 extension of § 5 constitutional and stating that "Congress' considered determination that at
least another 7 years of statutory remedies were necessary to counter the perpetuation of 95 years
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The history of discrimination in voting against language minorities
was described by Congress as "pervasive and national in scope."21
Based upon testimony presented at hearings in 1975,22 it concluded that
language minorities had "been denied equal educational opportunities
by state and local governments" causing them to have "severe disabilities and continuing illiteracy" in English. These language barriers, coupled with English-only registration and voting procedures, as well as
"acts of physical, economic, and political intimidation," excluded language minorities from effective political participation and were the rationale for passage of the special minority language provisions of the
23
1975 Act.
Congress strengthened the protections of the Act again in 1982 by
extending preclearance until the year 200724 and by amending section 2
to provide that any voting practice which "results" in discrimination on
the basis of race, color or membership in a language minority is unlawful. 25 The Act's condemnation of vote denial and the preclearance reof pervasive voting discrimination is both unsurprising and unassailable").
21. 1975 Act, Pub. L. No. 94-73, sec. 203, § 4(f)(1), 89 Stat. at 401 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1973b(f)() (1982)).
22. See Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearings on S. 407, S. 903, S. 1297, S.
1409 and S. 1443, Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary,94th Cong., 1st Sess. 214-29, 255-68, 738-56, 756-89 (1975).
23. 1975 Act, Pub. L. No. 94-73, sec. 203, § 4(f)(1), 89 Stat. at 401 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1973b(f)(l) (1982)); see also S. REP. No. 295, supra note 6, at 24-30, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE,
supra note 6, at 790-97 (discussing various forms of discrimination against Hispanics, Asian Amer-

icans, Alaskan Natives, and American Indians); F.

COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW

157-

62 (1971) (describing state restrictions on Indian voting and office holding); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: UNFULFILLED GOALS 76-78 (1981) [hereinafter UNFULFILLED
GOALS].

See generally McCool, supra note 16, in

AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY,

supra note 16.

24. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, sec. 2, 96 Stat. 131, 131-32
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(8) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) [hereinafter 1982 Act]. At the present
time, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia, and portions of California, Florida, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina,
and South Dakota are covered by § 5. See 28 C.F.R. § 51 app. (1988). Section 4(a) of the 1965 Act
established a new scheme for bailout from § 5 coverage designed to encourage jurisdictions to
change their voting practices and thereby eliminate barriers to minority political participation. See
H.R. REP. No. 227, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1981) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 2271; S. REP. No. 417,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 417], reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 177 [hereinafter 1982 U.S. CODE]. Five suits seeking bailout have been filed since passage of
the 1982 amendments. See G. HEBERT, VOTING CASES AT THE DISTRICT COURT LEVEL IN WHICH
UNITED STATES BEGAN AFTER JANUARY

20, 1981 (Dep't of Justice July 1, 1988) (citing Alaska v.

United States, (D.D.C. 1984); Waihee (Hawaii) v. United States, (D.D.C. 1984); Connecticut v.
United States, (D.D.C. 1983); Massachusetts v. United States, (D.D.C. 1983); Board of Comm'rs v.
United States, (D.D.C. 1982). For a discussion of the operation of § 4(a), see Hancock & Tredway,
The Bailout Standard of the Voting Rights Act: An Incentive to End Discrimination, 17 URB.
LAW.

379 (1985).

25. See 1982 Act, Pub. L. No. 97-205, sec. 2, 96 Stat. at 131-32 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
1973(a) (1982)). Amended § 2 provides:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be

§
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quirement were crucial to the advances in minority political
participation. Equally crucial was the prior and parallel development of
the prohibition on vote dilution which the 1982 amendments embodied
in the results standard of section 2. It allowed minorities, even when
they had free access to registration and voting, to successfully challenge
practices that submerged their voting strength or denied them equal
and effective participation in the political process.
A.

The Development of the Prohibitionon Vote Dilution
1.

Origins of the Prohibition

Vote dilution has been described as "a process whereby election
laws or practices, either singly or in concert, combine with systematic
bloc voting among an identifiable group to diminish the voting strength
of at least one other group. ' 26 Vote dilution can take many forms, including reapportionment plans that unnecessarily fragment or concen-

trate black population," numbered posts, 28 staggered terms, 29 majority
imposed or applied by any state or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial
or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or
color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, as
provided in subsection (b) of this section.
Id. The 1982 amendments also provide that any voter who requires assistance because of a disability or an inability to read or write is entitled to assistance by a person of the voter's choice, except
for an employer or agent of the employer, or officer or agent of the voter's union. Id. sec. 5, § 208,
96 Stat. at 135 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-6 (1982)).
26. MINoRITY VoTE DILUTION 4 (C. Davidson ed. 1984) [hereinafter VOTE DILUTION]. The prohibition on vote dilution was explained and defended by the Supreme Court as follows:
There is more to the right to vote than the right to mark a piece of paper and drop it in a box
or the right to pull a lever in a voting booth. The right to vote includes the right to have the
ballot counted.. . . It also includes the right to have the vote counted at full value without
dilution or discount. . . . That federally protected right suffers substantial dilution . . .
[where a] favored group has full voting strength.... [and] [tihe groups not in favor have
their votes discounted.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 n.29 (1964) (quoting South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 279 (1950)
(Douglas, J., dissenting)); see also Allen v. Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969) (stating
that "[t]he right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute
prohibition on casting a ballot").
27. See, e.g., Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1982) (invalidating the reapportionment of Georgia's fourth and fifth congressional districts because it fragmented the minority population in the metropolitan Atlanta area), aff'd, 459 U.S. 1166 (1983).
28. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 627 (1982) (stating that "the requirement that
candidates run for specific seats. . . enhances appellee's lack of access because it prevents a cohesive political group from concentrating on a single candidate"); Dunston v. Scott, 336 F. Supp. 206
(E.D.N.C. 1972) (finding North Carolina's anti-single shot and numbered seat laws
unconstitutional).
29. See, e.g., City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 183-85 (stating that "staggered terms . . . have the
effect of forcing head-to-head contests between Negroes and whites and depriving Negroes of the
opportunity to elect a candidate by single-shot voting").
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vote requirements,3 0 discriminatory annexations, 3 ' and the abolition of
elected or appointed offices.3 2 Perhaps the preeminent form of vote dilution today is at-large voting, or multimember districting. Under an atlarge scheme all the residents of a town, county, or other jurisdiction
vote for all the members of a city council, county commission, or other
governmental body. The majority, if it votes as a bloc, can choose all
the officeholders, thereby denying a discrete minority an effective opportunity to elect any representatives of its choice.33 Whatever their
name or description, the effect-and frequently the purpose-of practices that dilute minority voting strength is to wipe out the gains made
in minority voter registration since passage of the Voting Rights Act. 4
The use of single member districts, in which members of the minority group constitute a majority, usually can remedy dilution from atlarge voting. For this reason, among others, federal courts are required,
absent unusual circumstances, to utilize all single member districts in
court ordered reapportionment. 5 Although under increasing attack, atlarge voting remains common at the municipal, county, and state levels
throughout the United States. 6
30. See, e.g., City of Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159, 167 (1982) (stating that "[iln
the context of racial bloc voting. . . the [majority vote] rule would permanently foreclose a black
candidate from being elected to an at-large seat"); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973)
(finding that a majority vote requirement "enhance[s] the opportunity for racial discrimination").
31. See, e.g., City of Port Arthur, 459 U.S. at 166-67.
32. See, e.g., McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236 (1984).
33. At-large elections, although not unconstitutional per se, have been criticized frequently
for their "winner take all" character and their tendency to disadvantage minorities. See, e.g.,
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47-48 (1986); Rogers, 458 U.S. at 616-17; Chapman v. Meier,
420 U.S. 1, 16 (1975). One commentator has described the discriminatory effect of at-large elections as "one of the best-substantiated propositions in political science." Grofman, "One Person,
One Vote": The Legacy of Baker v. Carr,Paper for a Twentieth Century Fund Conference 9 (Jan.
6-7, 1989) (source on file with Author). Justice Stevens has written that at-large elections are sufficiently suspect to justify a congressional ban on their use in jurisdictions covered by § 5. Rogers,
458 U.S. at 632 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Davidson & Korbel, At-Large Elections and
Minority-Group Representation:A Re-Examination of Historical and Contemporary Evidence,
43 J. POL. 982 (1981).
34. For a discussion of vote dilution practices, particularly those adopted to counter increased minority registration after passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, see: H.R. REP. No.
227, supra note 24; S. REP. No. 417, supra note 24, at 6, 10-14, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE, supra
note 24, at 187-91; A. DERFNER, L. MCDONALD & C. McTEER, LITIGATION UNDER THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT OF 1965, at 11-3 (1986); UNFULFILLED GoALs, supra note 23; UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CiVIr
RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS Acm, TEN YEARS AFTER (1975); McDonald, supra note 4, at 68-80; and
Rios & Alonzo, A Survey of Chicano Representation in 361 Texas Public School Boards 1979/80
(1981).
35. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 639 (1976); Wallace v. House,
515 F.2d 619 (1975), cert. granted, vacated and remanded, 425 U.S. 947 (1976).
36. As of November 1970, 46% of the upper houses and 62% of the lower houses in the states
contained some multimember, at-large elected, districts. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124,
157 n.37 (1971). In 1980 more than 60% of cities elected some, or all, of their council members atlarge. See Grofman, Alternatives to Single-Member PluralityDistricts: Legal and Empirical Is-
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The prohibition on vote dilution, which continues to generate substantial controversy, has its roots in Baker v. Carr37 and later cases
which establish that voting power must be apportioned equally among
the electorate on the basis of population. Baker in turn had its roots in
the race discrimination jurisprudence of the Court. For example, the
Baker Court cited Gomillion v. Lightfoot ss for the proposition that legislative apportionment was justiciable. Gomillion held unconstitutional
the redrawing of the boundaries of Tuskegee, Alabama by the state legislature to exclude blacks from the city limits and thus to deny them
the right to vote.
After Baker, the Court in Gray v. Sanders9 invalidated Georgia's
"county unit system" used in primaries for statewide office because the
system gave counties having a third of the state's population a majority
of the voting power. According to the Court, "The conception of political equality. . . can mean only one thing-one person, one vote. ' 40 The
following year, in Wesberry v. Sanders,41 the Court struck down Georgia's congressional apportionment on the grounds that some districts
had twice the population of others. The Court held that "the command
of Art. 1, § 2 [of the Constitution] . . .means that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as
42
much as another's.
The Court followed Gray and Wesberry in Reynolds v. Sims. 43 In
Reynolds, the Court found Alabama's legislative apportionment to be
unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment because senate and house districts were of unequal size and
resulted in "[d]iluting the weight of votes" of residents of the more
populous districts. Fortson v. Dorsey,4 5 decided after Reynolds but
sues, 9 POL'Y STUD. J. 875-89 (1980-1981).
37. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The controversy has concerned the justiciability of vote dilution, the
standards for measuring dilution, the individuals or groups entitled to press claims of dilution, and
the appropriate remedies. The literature of vote dilution is extensive. See, e.g., B. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE (1984); VOTE DILUTION, supra note 26; Blacksher & Menefee, From Reynolds
v. Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden: Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth
Amendment?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1982); Symposium, Gerrymanderingand the Courts, 33 UCLA
L. REv. 1 (1985).
38. 369 U.S. at 229-30 (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)).
39. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
40. Id. at 381.
41. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
42. Id. at 7-8.
43. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
44. Id. at 566. It would be more accurate to say that the Court found the state's refusal to
reapportion unconstitutional. The state had last reapportioned in 1901 and population-variance
ratios in 1964 were as high as 41-to-1 in the Senate and 16-to-1 in the House. Id. at 545. In striking
down this submergence of voting power, the Court indicated that the right of voters "to have their
votes counted," the basis of the one person-one vote rule, was grounded in its prior decisions re-
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several months before passage of the Voting Rights Act, explicitly held
that voting strength could be diluted on the basis of race as well as
population inequality. The Court rejected a facial challenge to countywide voting for members of the state senate in several multidistrict
counties in Georgia. However, at-large elections, or multimember districts, while not unconstitutional per se, would be unlawful if they "designedly or otherwise. . . operate to minimize or cancel out the voting
strength of racial or political elements of the voting population."4 6
Sims v. Baggett, 7 the district court's decision on remand from
Reynolds v. Sims, was one of the first cases relying on the authority of
Fortson v. Dorsey to invalidate a districting plan on the ground that it
diluted minority voting strength. After Reynolds the all white Alabama
legislature reapportioned itself in the following manner. The plan for
the house treated counties as the basic voting unit except in the case of
majority black counties. These were aggregated with predominantly
white counties into multiseat districts with overall white majorities.
The district court described this procedure as "turning Negro majorities into minorities."4 8 Rather than "prove that justice is both blind and
deaf,"4 the court struck down the house plan because it had the purpose and effect of discriminating against blacks by diluting their voting
strength. According to the district court, the "dilution of Negro voting
power by racial gerrymandering is just as discriminatory as complete
disfranchisement or total segregation." 50
In the Supreme Court's first decision construing the scope of the
preclearance requirement of section 5, Allen v. State Board of Elecgarding discrimination against black voters. Id. at 554-55 (citing United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S.
383 (1915) (holding that all voters have a right to have their votes counted)); see also Gomillion V.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); United States v. Saylor, 322

U.S. 385 (1944) (holding that a vote may not be diluted by ballot box stuffing); Smith v. Allwright,

321 U.S. 649 (1944) (finding the exclusion of blacks from party primary unconstitutional); Nixon v.

Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Guinn v. United States, 238
U.S. 347 (1915) (invalidating a grandfather clause discriminating against blacks); Ex parte Siebold,

100 U.S. 371 (1879).
45. 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
46. Id. at 439.
47.

247 F. Supp. 96 (M.D. Ala. 1965).

48. Id. at 109.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 109. The theme of the unfairness of at-large or multiseat districts was repeated in
subsequent vote dilution cases. See Smith v. Paris, 257 F. Supp. 901, 904 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (citing
Sims v.Baggett). In Wallace v. House, 515 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1975), the court found:

The particular vice of multi-member districts . . .is their tendency to minimize minority
representation even at the lowest political levels in a way that could not occur if single-member districts existed in their stead. Multi-member districts thus pose a problem of degree of
fair representation-"fair" not in the sense either of "considerable" or of "proportionate," but
rather in a general sense of equity.
Id. at 629; see also Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 951 (1980).
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tions,51 a majority of the Court concluded on the basis of the legislative

history that Congress intended the Act to have "the broadest possible
scope" and to prohibit the more subtle forms of vote dilution, as well as
the obvious forms of vote denial.2 Citing Reynolds v. Sims, the Court
held that "[t]he right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting
power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot," and
that section 5 preclearance applied to such changes as the adoption of
at-large voting.53 This broad standard for preclearance, which acknowledged the applicability of concepts of vote dilution to the Voting Rights
Act, was approved expressly by Congress in the 1970, 1975, and 1982
amendments and has been consistently applied by the courts and the
Attorney General. 4
2. The Search for Standards in Racial Vote Dilution Cases
The "minimize or cancel out" language of Fortson v. Dorsey55 was
echoed in later cases,56 but was not applied by the Supreme Court until
the decision in Whitcomb v. Chavis5K in 1971. Whitcomb concerned a

challenge to at-large elections in Marion County, Indiana. The district
court invalidated a multimember legislative district for the county because few blacks had been elected to office.58 The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that "[tihe voting power of ghetto residents may have
been 'cancelled out' as the District Court held, but this seems a mere
euphemism for political defeat at the polls.

59

The Court indicated,

however, that the result would have been different had plaintiffs pro51. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
52. Id. at 566-67. The Court relied on the Attorney General's statements throughout the
legislative hearings that § 5 was to have "a broad scope and [on] Congress' refusal to engraft even
minor exceptions" on the preclearance requirement. Id. at 568.
53. Id. at 569. Other voting practices at issue in Allen and found to be subject to the
preclearance requirement because of the risk of vote dilution included new procedures for casting
write-in votes, a change from elected to appointed county officials, and changes in the requirements for independent candidates running in general elections. Justice Harlan, who dissented on
similar grounds in Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 621, argued that there were no clear standards for determining vote dilution because "it is not clear. . . how a court would go about deciding whether an
at-large system is to be preferred over a district system." Allen, 393 U.S. at 586 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan believed that § 5 applied to all the voting changes before the Court, with
the exception of the change from district to at-large voting. Id. at 591-93 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
54. See, e.g., City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 467-68 (1987); NAACP v.
Hampton County Election Comm'n, 470 U.S. 166, 175-76 (1985); Dougherty County v. White, 439
U.S. 32, 37-39 (1978); H.R. REP. No. 227, supra note 24, at 34-35; S.REP. No. 417, supra note 24, at
6-7 & n.8, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE, supra note 24, at 182-84 & n.8; 28 C.F.R. § 51.12 (1988).
55. See supra notes 45, 46 and accompanying text.
56. See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966); see also Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182,
184 n.2 (1971).
57. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
58. Id. at 148-49, 164.
59. Id. at 153.
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duced evidence that minorities had less opportunity than other residents in the district to participate in the political process and to elect
legislators of their choice.60
Two years later, in another racial vote dilution case, White v. Reg1 the Court found a denial
ister,"
of equal voting opportunity on facts
absent in Whitcomb. In a unanimous opinion by Justice White, who
had written for the majority in Whitcomb, the Court invalidated multiseat legislative districts in Dallas and Bexar Counties, Texas, because
they diluted black (Dallas) and Mexican-American (Bexar) voting
strength. The plaintiffs did not rely solely on the lack of proportional
representation of minorities as proof of dilution, as had been done in
Whitcomb. 2 Instead, they based their case on a broad range of factors
affecting minority political participation. They showed: (1) a history of
official discrimination against blacks in Dallas and Mexican-Americans
in Bexar; (2) the existence of a white slating group and racial campaign
tactics in Dallas; (3) cultural and language barriers and depressed voter
registration in Bexar; (4) a lack of responsiveness by elected officials to
the needs of the minority community in Bexar; and (5) numbered post
and majority vote requirements in both jurisdictions. Based on the "totality of the circumstances," and mindful of the "cultural and economic
realities" characteristic of at-large voting,"3 the Court concluded that
blacks and Mexican-Americans "had less opportunity than did other
residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to
elect legislators of their choice. '6' The Court affirmed as well the district court's finding that single member districts for Dallas and Bexar
were required as a remedy "to bring the [minority] community into the
full stream of political life of the county and State by encouraging their
' 65
further registration, voting, and other political activity.
White v. Regester was applied and elaborated on by the lower federal courts, principally those in the Fifth Circuit which handled the
greatest number of voting rights cases during the 1970s. 66 The most an60. Id. at 149-50.
61. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
62. According to the majority in Whitcomb, there was no "evidence for] findings that ghetto
residents had less opportunity than did other Marion County residents to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice." Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 149. The issue in
Whitcomb was whether blacks were discriminated against merely because their candidates "los[t]
too many elections." Id. at 153.
63. White, 412 U.S. at 769.
64. Id. at 766.
65. Id. at 769.
66. Twenty-three minority vote dilution cases were decided by federal circuit courts prior to
1978. Of those, 19 were decided by the old Fifth Circuit comprising Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Alabama, Georgia, and Florida. One case was decided by each of the First, Fourth, Seventh, and
Eighth Circuits. See Voting Rights Act: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on the Constitutionof the
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alytically rigorous and influential of these cases was the en banc decision in Zimmer v. McKeithen.6 7 Zimmer identified four primary and
four enhancing factors (known as the Zimmer factors or criteria) derived from White v. Regester and adopted them as the test for resolving
claims of vote dilution. 8 The primary factors were: (1) a lack of access
to the process of slating candidates; (2) the unresponsiveness of legislators to the particularized interests of the minority community; (3) a
tenuous state policy underlying the preference for multimember or atlarge districting; and (4) the existence of past discrimination in general
that precluded effective minority participation in the election system.
The enhancing factors included the existence of large districts, majority
vote requirements, anti-single shot voting provisions and the lack of
provision for at-large candidates running from particular geographical
subdistricts.69 Dilution could be shown by proof of "an aggregate of
these factors," and no particular factor or number of factors had to be
proved to obtain relief.70
After the decision in Washington v. Davis,7 1 the Fifth Circuit, anticipating the holding in City of Mobile v. Bolden,72 held in Nevett v.
Sides7 3 that plaintiffs in vote dilution cases must show that the challenged practice was racially motivated. Nevett did not change the plaintiff's burden of proof, however, since the court held that "a finding of
racially discriminatory dilution under the Zimmer criteria raises an inference of intent and, therefore, that a finding under the criteria satis7' 4
fies the intent requirement of Washington v. Davis.
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1205-07, 1216-26 (1982) [hereinafter Voting
Rights Act Hearings] (statement of Frank R. Parker, Lawyers Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law).
See generally Bonapfel, Minority Challenges to At-Large Elections: The Dilution Problem, 10 GA.
L. REv. 353 (1976).
67.

485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973).

68. Zimmer was apparently an attempt by the Fifth Circuit to establish more precise evidentiary standards for dilution cases than had been articulated in White v.Regester.
69.

See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.

70. Zimmer, 485 F.2d at 1305. For decisions applying the Zimmer factors, see: Hendrix v.
Joseph, 559 F.2d 1265 (5th Cir. 1977); Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139, 143 (5th Cir.
1977) (en banc); and Wallace v. House, 515 F.2d 619, 630 (5th Cir. 1975). See also supra note 66.
71. 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that proof of racial purpose was a necessary element of a
fourteenth amendment employment discrimination claim).
72. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). For a discussion of City of Mobile v. Bolden, see infra notes 75-91
and accompanying text.
73.

571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978).

74.

Id. at 217.
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City of Mobile v. Bolden and Subjective Racial Intent

Zimmer was the reigning standard for vote dilution cases for seven
years until the Supreme Court toppled it in City of Mobile v. Bolden."
The Court had affirmed Zimmer on the basis that a court ordered plan
ordinarily must use single member districts, but "without approval of
the constitutional views expressed by the Court of Appeals." 6 The
Court's dissatisfaction with the Zimmer standards was signaled more
directly in Wise v. Lipscomb,7 in which four of the Justices described
Zimmer as a "highly amorphous theory" and suggested that it should
not apply to municipal governments.78 Then, in 1980, a sharply divided
Court in City of Mobile v. Bolden established a subjective intent standard for vote dilution claims under the Constitution and section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act and repudiated the Zimmer criteria.79 The plurality held that a plaintiff had to produce evidence that a challenged
practice was racially motivated and that proof of the Zimmer factors
was "most assuredly insufficient to prove an unconstitutionally discriminatory purpose in the present case."80

There was no majority opinion on the standards to be used in determining racial purpose in vote dilution cases. The plurality opinion of
Justice Stewart, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and
Rehnquist, held that proof of racial purpose was required.8 1 Justices
Marshall and Brennan argued in dissent that racial purpose should not
be an element of a dilution claim. 2 The remaining opinions of Justices
Stevens, Blackmun, and White did not address the intent issue.
Although the totality of facts in Bolden, according to Justice White
in dissent, was "even more compelling than that present in White v.
Regester,"as and even though White granted relief on evidence of the
effect of at-large voting without even discussing any requirement of
proving discriminatory purpose, the plurality insisted that the two cases
were wholly consistent.8 Because there was no majority opinion
describing the legal standards for proving intent, and given the plural75. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
76. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 638 (1976).
77. 437 U.S. 535 (1978).
78. Id. at 550.
79. Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stevens, Justice Stewart, Justice Powell, and Justice Rehnquist rejected Zimmer, 446 U.S. 55. In all, there were six separate opinions in Bolden.
80. Id. at 73. Justice Marshall dissented on the ground that § 2 and the fifteenth amendment
prohibited voting practices that had an adverse racial effect as well as those that were purposefully
discriminatory. Id. at 104-05 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 72-74.
82. Id. at 94 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 103 (White, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 69.
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ity's rejection of circumstantial evidence to show racial purpose, Justice
White warned that Bolden "leaves the courts below adrift on uncharted
seas with respect to how to proceed on remand."8 5 Justice White proved
to be correct.
The lower courts disagreed on the meaning and application of the
Bolden intent standard. In McMillan v. Escambia County,8 for example, one panel of the Fifth Circuit held that reliance on the Zimmer
factors "would be erroneous,' 87 and that the responsiveness of elected
officials to the needs of the black community was "not relevant."8 8 In
another voting case decided the following month, Lodge v. Buxton,8 9 a
different panel wrote that the Supreme Court was actually directing
lower courts to apply the Zimmer criteria "to the extent that they are
relevant to the factual context at hand,""0 and that unresponsiveness
was an "essential element" of a vote dilution claim. 91
Judge Goldberg of the Fifth Circuit criticized strongly the subjective intent standard of Bolden and, borrowing a phrase from Justice
Rehnquist's concurring opinion in Wise, 2 called it an "indecisive" and
"amorphous holding. '9 3 Often it would be impossible in voting cases, he
said, "to conduct the postmortem psychoanalysis of all of the legislators
or councilmen responsible for the institution of the plan in order to
meet the 'subjective intent' standard."9' 4 He also defended the Zimmer
criteria as "a jurisprudence produced by ten years of struggle and compromise between judges of varying political and jurisprudential backgrounds . . . [which] relied on legal principles whose merit had been
tested and affirmed by the trial of reality and experience. "' 9 5 In rejecting
Zimmer, he lamented, the Court was "casting aside the ten years of
thought, experience and struggle embodied within it." 9
85. Id. at 103 (White, J., dissenting).
86. 638 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1981).
87. Id. at 1247 n.16.
88. Id. at 1248 n.18.
89. 639 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. Unit B Mar. 1981).
90. Id. at 1373.
91. Id. at 1375.
92. 437 U.S. at 550 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
93. Jones v. City of Lubbock, 640 F.2d 777, 779 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981).
94. Id. at 779 n.6.
95. Id. at 777; see Parker, The "Results" Test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Abandoning the Intent Standard, 69 VA. L. REv. 715, 725 (1983) (describing the White-Zimmer approach as "flexible, fact-specific, precise, and workable"); cf. Grofman, Criteria for Districting:A
Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REv. 77, 144 (1985).
96. Jones, 640 F.2d at 777.
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4. The Results Standard of the 1982 Amendments
Congress adopted the results standard in 1982 in response to City
of Mobile v. Bolden. Unhappy with the subjective intent standard of
Bolden, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act in order "to reinstate
Congress' earlier intent that violations of the Voting Rights Act, including Section 2, could be established by showing the discriminatory effect
of the challenged practices. ' 97 Congress repudiated the intent standard
for three basic reasons: it was "unnecessarily divisive" because it required plaintiffs to prove that local officials were racists, the burden of
proof was "inordinately difficult," and it "ask[ed] the wrong
question."'9 8
One of the most dramatic examples of the inadequacy of the City
of Mobile v. Bolden standard cited in the legislative history was McCain v. Lybrand.9 9 Five days before the decision in Bolden the district
court, in a detailed and exhaustive opinion, invalidated at-large elections in Edgefield County, South Carolina, concluding that black political participation "has been merely tokenism and even that has been on
a very small scale."10 0 After the Bolden decision, however, the court
withdrew its opinion on the grounds that plaintiffs had not proven that
the voting system was intentionally discriminatory. 10 In addressing the
inappropriate result in McCain v. Lybrand, Congress concluded that
the "right" question was not the subjective intent of legislators but
whether minorities have "a fair opportunity to participate" in the polit10 2
ical process.
The legislative history of the 1982 amendments sets out certain
readily verifiable factors derived from White, Zimmer, and other voting
cases, which courts ordinarily should consider in dilution cases. These
factors included bloc voting, a history of discrimination, depressed
levels of minority employment and income, and few minorities elected
to office. Congress also described subjective factors courts should avoid
considering, including responsiveness to minority communities and racial motive. 103 In detailing the factors showing vote dilution, Congress
97. H.R. REP. No. 227, supra note 24, at 29; S. REP. No. 417, supra note 24, at 17-19, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE, supra note 24, at 194-97; see also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30
(1986).
98. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 24, at 36-37, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE, supra note 24, at
214-15.
99. Civ. No. 74-281 (D.S.C. Apr. 17, 1980); see S. REP. No. 417, supra note 24, at 26, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE, supra note 24, at 203-04.
100. McCain, Civ. No. 74-281, slip op. at 18.
101. Id. (order of Aug. 11, 1980).
102. S.REP. No. 417, supra note 24, at 36, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE, supra note 24, at 214;
see Gingles, 478 U.S. 30.
103. A complete list of "typical factors" showing vote dilution was identified in the Senate
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acted partly in response to criticism that the results test was amorphous, or had no "core, ' '1o 4 and partly to restore the analytical framework in White as articulated in Zimmer. The factors were illustrative,
not exhaustive, and no particular number of them had to be proved. As
under White and Zimmer, the ultimate question was whether the challenged practice denied the minority an equal opportunity to participate
and to elect candidates of its choice, a question that could be answered
only by "a searching practical evaluation of the 'past and present
reality.' "I05
5.

Judicial Response to the 1982 Amendments

Two days after Congress amended section 2, the Supreme Court
decided Rogers v. Lodge,10 6 another vote dilution case involving a challenge to at-large elections for the county council in Burke County,
report: A history of discrimination, the existence of polarized voting, the use of enhancing devices
(such as majority vote requirements), the presence of slating groups, the continuing effects of past
discrimination, the existence of racial campaign appeals, and the extent of minority office holding.
S. REP. No. 417, supra note 24, at 28-30, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE, supra note 24, at 205-08.
Other factors having possible probative value were a lack of responsiveness and a tenuous policy
underlying the use of the challenged practice. The House report is generally to the same effect.
H.R. REP. No. 227, supra note 24, at 30. Both reports indicate, however, that an inquiry into responsiveness ordinarily should be avoided. According to the House report, responsiveness was a
"highly subjective" factor and its use had created "inconsistencies among court decisions on the
same or similar facts and confusion about the law." Id. In Cross v. Baxter, 604 F.2d 875, 883 (5th
Cir. 1979), for example, the court set aside the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' challenge to
at-large elections in Moultrie, Georgia in part because the trial court erred in finding that plaintiffs
had failed to prove unresponsiveness. On remand, the trial court again found no unresponsiveness
and again dismissed the complaint. Although the evidence of unresponsiveness was essentially the
same on the second appeal, a different panel affirmed, ruling that "the finding, that plaintiff had
failed to prove unresponsiveness. . .is amply supported and not clearly erroneous." Cross v. Baxter, 639 F.2d 1383, 1384 (5th Cir. Unit B Mar. 1981). The plaintiffs' petition for a writ of certiorari
was granted and the Court remanded for further consideration in light of the amendment to § 2 of
the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982). Cross v. Baxter, 460 U.S. 1065 (1983). On the
second remand the trial court entered a consent order establishing district elections for the Moultrie city council. Cross v. Baxter, Civ. No. 76-20-THOM (M.D. Ga. July 24, 1984).
104. Senator Orrin Hatch (R.-Utah), one of the most vocal of the critics, charged that the
results standard had no "core value. . .other than election results" and that the mere absence of
proportional minority representation would be enough to invalidate a challenged voting system. S.
REP. No. 417, supra note 24, at 96, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE, supra note 24, at 269. The Administration also opposed the amendment of § 2. Attorney General William French Smith testified
before the Senate subcommittee that the bill to amend § 2 would change the law radically and was
"bad legislation." Voting Rights Act Hearings, supra note 66, at 78. Assistant Attorney General
William Bradford Reynolds testified that the results test of § 2 "threatens to undermine a basic
principle of our democratic system of Government." Id. at 1662. The Act, however, was passed by
overwhelming majorities in both houses. 127 CONG. REc. H7011 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1982) (passed
389-24); 128 CONG. REC. S7139 (daily ed. June 18, 1982) (passed 95-9); 128 CONG. REc. H3840 (daily
ed. June 23, 1982) (motion to concur in Senate amendments passed unanimously).
105. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 24, at 30, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE, supra note 24, at
207-08.
106. 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
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Georgia. The facts in Rogers were very similar to those in City of Mobile v. Bolden. In both cases the lower courts found dilution using a
White-Zimmer analysis without direct evidence of racial purpose. In
Rogers, the Court affirmed and effectively restored the White totalityof-facts analysis for voting challenges based on the Constitution. The
Court affirmed its ruling in City of Mobile v. Bolden that proof of racial
purpose was required, but explained that it had never intended to imply that racial purpose could not be inferred from the totality of relevant facts. According to the Court, "discriminatory intent need not be
proved by direct evidence. 'Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory
purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant

facts.'

'o107

City of Mobile v. Bolden and Rogers v. Lodge probably cannot be
distinguished on their facts but can be best understood as a reflection
of changes in the membership of the Court and the position of the
Chief Justice. Justice O'Connor had replaced Justice Stewart, who
wrote the plurality opinion in City of Mobile v. Bolden, and she voted
to sustain the finding of dilution in Rogers v. Lodge. Chief Justice Burger, confronted with the outrageous facts in Rogers, and, according to
one observer, "stung by nationwide criticism of the Bolden decision," 10 8
changed sides and voted with the Burke County plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court first construed amended section 2 in Thornburg v. Gingles,0 9 a challenge to six multimember districts in North
Carolina's 1982 legislative reapportionment. A majority of the Court
(Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and White) established a three part test for determining when multimember districting
violated the results standard of the statute. First, the minority must be
able to show that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to
constitute a majority in one or more single member districts. Second, it
must be able to show that it is politically cohesive, or tends to vote as a
bloc. Third, it must show that the majority votes sufficiently as a bloc
"usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." '1 0
107. Id. at 618 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)). The Court also resolved the disagreement among panels of the Fifth Circuit over the relevance of evidence of unresponsiveness in constitutional challenges. See supra notes 66-96 and accompanying text. According
to the Court, evidence of unresponsiveness was not an essential element of a claim of vote dilution
"but only one of a number of circumstances a court should consider in determining whether discriminatory purpose may be inferred." Rogers, 458 U.S. at 625 n.9.
108. VOTE DILUTION, supra note 26, at 161. For examples of criticism of Bolden from the
legal community, see: Soifer, Complacency and ConstitutionalLaw, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 383 (1981);

The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HAv. L. Rav. 75, 138 (1980); Note, Vote Dilution Claims
Confined, 10 STETSON L. REv. 363 (1981).
109. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
110. Id. at 51 (Brennan, J., Marshall, J., Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J.); id. at 82-83 (White,
J., concurring). This analysis is essentially the one rejected by the Court earlier in Whitcomb, 403
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The Court adopted, in its words, a "functional" view of the political process and isolated "the most important Senate Report factors
bearing on § 2 challenges to multimember districts,""' which, if proved,
compel a finding of a statutory violation. The other factors discussed in
the legislative history, such as the lingering effects of discrimination,
racial campaign appeals, and the use of enhancing devices, were deemed
1 2
supportive of, but not essential to, a vote dilution claim.
Four other Justices (Burger, O'Connor, Powell, and Rehnquist)
concurred in the judgment. The majority affirmed that the reapportionment plan of four multimember districts in which minorities had had
only minimal electoral success violated section 2. The Court reversed as
to a fifth, House District 23, on the grounds that the lower court had
ignored "the significance of the sustained success black voters have experienced."'" 3 The Court explicitly rejected the argument for reversal
pressed by the State of North Carolina and the Solicitor General, who
filed an amicus brief and participated in oral argument, that token or
minimal minority electoral success foreclosed as a matter of law a section 2 claim in any of the challenged districts." 4 According to the
Court, "[w]here multimember districting generally works to dilute the
minority vote, it cannot be defended on the ground that it sporadically
'' 5
and serendipitously benefits minority voters. 1
The Court also simplified proof of racial bloc voting. North Carolina argued, relying on the language of several lower court decisions,
that plaintiffs had to show not simply a correlation between race of voters and race of candidates, but that voters were voting for reasons of
race, and not based on some other variable, such as religion, party affiliation, age, campaign expenditures, or name identification."' Gingles reU.S. 124, rev'g Chavis v. Whitcomb, 305 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D. Ind. 1969), a fact noted by Justice
O'Connor in her concurring opinion in Gingles, 478 U.S. at 99. According to the Court in Whitcomb, one flaw in the district court's opinion was the expression as a general proposition that
reapportionment was unconstitutional if a minority "is numerous enough to command at least an
area sufficiently compact to constitute a single-member district . . . but who in one year or another, or year after year, are submerged in a one-sided multi-member district vote." Whitcomb,
403 U.S. at 156.
111. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48-49 n.15.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 77 (emphasis in original). Black voters in District 23 (Durham County) had enjoyed proportional representation in their legislative delegation since 1973. Justices Stevens, Marshall and Blackmun dissented from the finding that the reapportionment for House District 23 did
not violate § 2. Id. at 106.
114. Id. at 74-78. The adoption of this argument, which was consistent with the Administration's announced opposition to the results standard, would have greatly diminished the effectiveness of the amended statute.
115. Id. at 76.
116. See Lee County Branch of NAACP v. City of Opelika, 748 F.2d 1473, 1482 (5th Cir.
1984); Jones v. City of Lubbock, 730 F.2d 233, 234 (5th Cir. 1984) (Higginbotham, J., concurring)
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jected this attempted backdoor reintroduction of an intent requirement
in vote dilution cases. According to the Court, "[a]U that matters under
§ 2 and under a functional theory of vote dilution is voter behavior, not
its explanations. ' 117 Bloc voting could be shown "where there is 'aconsistent relationship between [the] race of the voter and the way in
which the voter votes,' . . . or to put it differently, where 'black voters
and white voters vote differently.' "1118 While no simple doctrinal test is

applicable in all cases, legally significant racial bloc voting exists in general where "a white bloc vote . . .normally will defeat the combined

strength of minority support plus white 'crossover votes.',19
The Court thus simplified and added predictability to the application of the standard for determining vote dilution in cases challenging
discriminatory districting. By focusing almost exclusively on
demographics and racial patterns in elections the Court attempted to
place claims of vote dilution based on race on the same evidentiary
footing as claims of vote dilution based on population disparities. The
Gingles inquiry avoids unnecessary investigation into historical, social,
and economic dynamics and intent, and attempts to measure dilution in
the same objective way as the one person, one vote rule. That does not
mean, however, that the White-Zimmer analysis has been completely
superseded. As the legislative history and Gingles indicate, the WhiteZimmer factors are still relevant in supporting claims of vote dilution
(the Solicitor General supported the state in this argument).
117. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 73. Four of the Justices (Burger, O'Connor, Powell, and Rehnquist)

agreed that, while causation was not relevant to establish (or to rebut a showing) that "the minority group is politically cohesive and to assess its prospects for electoral success," it might be evidence that could "affect the overall vote dilution inquiry" by showing, for example, that minorities
"might be able to attract greater white support in future elections." Id. at 100.

118. Id. at 53 n.21. The Brennan plurality felt that while black and white voters may frequently prefer candidates of their own race, it is "the status of the candidate as the chosen representative of a particularracialgroup, not the race of the candidate, that is important." Id. at 68
(emphasis in original). Justice White and the O'Connor group believed that the race of the candidate was critical to distinguish racial voting from voting along party or interest-group lines. Id. at
84, 101. This disagreement, academic in most voting cases, would be relevant in determining the
existence of polarized voting vel non in cases where the minority favored a white candidate identi-

fied with minority interests who was defeated by members of the candidate's own race voting as a
group.
119. Id. at 56. On the same day that it decided Gingles, the Court expanded the scope of
vote dilution by holding for the first time that political gerrymandering was justiciable. Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). According to a plurality (Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun), "unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral system is arranged in
a manner that will consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the political
process as a whole." Id. at 132. The impact of Bandemer on minority political participation as a
competing claim in the construction of reapportionment plans is impossible to predict, although
the Court indicated that this admittedly laconic standard was not "intended in any way to suggest
an alteration of the standards developed in those cases for evaluating . . . claims [of racial vote
dilution]." Id. at 132 n.13.
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and it is unlikely that ordinary prudent counsel in contested cases
would fail to present, or the court to consider, such evidence if it existed. 12 0 The White-Zimmer analysis would also be relevant in cases
12 1
that did not involve districting or the use of multimember districts.
B. Rejection of the ProportionalRepresentation Argument in the
1982 Amendments
1.

The Proportional Representation Issue

Amended section 2 and Gingles put to rest an objection frequently
raised by defendants, and sometimes accepted by the courts, that the
creation of majority black districts to remedy vote dilution was unlawful proportional representation. In Marshall v. Edwards,22 decided
prior to the amendment of section 2, the Fifth Circuit ruled that equitable standards did not permit it to approve a county reapportionment
plan based on racially proportional representation. 2 3 According to the
court, "[a]lthough some democracies provide for proportional representation of parties and ethnic groups, it has never been an American tradition. 12 4 The rejected plan had been devised by the defendants to
120. Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1249-50 (5th Cir. 1988); Citizens for a Better
Gretna v. City of Gretna, 834 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Gomez v. City of Watsonville,
863 F.2d 1407, 1413 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that the Supreme Court put "substantially greater
emphasis on some of the Senate factors than on others"); Carrollton Branch of NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F.2d 1547, 1555 (11th Cir. 1987) (describing Gingles as "essentially a 'gloss' on the Senate
factors and a limitation on the interpretation of those factors in proving a vote dilution claim").
121. The limits of exclusive reliance on the Gingles analysis are also apparent in cases where
minorities, even though they are politically cohesive and the candidates of their choice are usually
defeated by whites voting as a bloc, are so dispersed that it is not possible to draw a majority
minority district. One court has held that under such circumstances plaintiffs failed to state a
cause of action under § 2. McNeil v. Springfield Park Dist., 851 F.2d 937, 942 (7th Cir. 1988)
(holding that "[iln fashioning a clear regime for a prima facie section 2 case, Gingles precludes
some small and unconcentrated minority groups from attempting to rectify vote dilution even
though they have 'less opportunity than other members in the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice' "). But is it arbitrary and contrary to
the spirit of the White-Zimmer analysis adopted by Congress in the 1982 amendment to conclude
that minorities are not entitled to any remedy at all for the admitted dilution of their voting
strength merely because a districting remedy is unavailable? That is elevating an accident of demography over claims of racial equality, an ironic and intolerable result under the Voting Rights
Act. A more appropriate test for cases in which the strict Gingles analysis is not applicable would
be whether vote dilution is shown by an aggregate of the Senate factors and, if so, whether the
dilution is corrigible-if not by single member districts then by some other electoral arrangement,
such as limited or cumulative voting. See infra text accompanying notes 190-98; cf. Gomez, 863
F.2d at 1414 (reversing the district court for arbitrarily dismissing a § 2 complaint because the
minority community was not geographically compact, that is, a majority of the minority community lived outside of two proposed minority districts).
122. 582 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1978).
123. Id. at 934-36.
124. Id. at 934-35; see Levinson, Gerrymanderingand the Brooding Omnipresence of Proportional Representation: Why Won't It Go Away?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 257 (1985).
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remedy the dilution effect of at-large elections. It created nine single
member districts, five of which were majority black and four of which
contained a majority of black registered voters. In reversing, the court
of appeals directed the district court on remand to formulate a new
plan giving more weight to "neutral values of rational boundaries, and
to districts of equal voting population, and less weight to the political
objective of proportional racial representation. ' 12 5
While a few other cases cited Marshallv. Edwards,12 6 the great majority either required or approved the use of effective majority black
voting districts.1 27 No one formulation fits all cases, but the courts frequently defined an effective minority district as one in which minorities
comprised approximately sixty-five percent of the total population.
This figure takes into account that the minority population may be
younger than the majority population and may have lower levels of registration and turnout due to the effects of past and continuing discrimination. The figure also has been used by the Department of Justice
and reapportionment experts in measuring the degree of minority population needed to provide minorities a meaningful opportunity to elect a
candidate of their choice. 2 '
The difficulty with relying on "neutral values" in reapportionment
is that they may provide no remedy at all for racial discrimination. In
majority white jurisdictions where voting is along racial lines, "racially
neutral" districts that contain all white majorities simply insure the
continued exclusion of minorities from effective political participation.
Common sense and fairness reject such "remedies" for discriminatory
vote dilution. As the court in Ketchum v. Byrne129 concluded, "[t]here
is simply no point in providing minorities with a 'remedy' for the illegal
deprivation of their representational rights in a form which will not in
125. Marshall, 582 F.2d at 938.
126. See, e.g., Wyche v. Madison Parish Police Jury, 635 F.2d 1151, 1163 (5th Cir. 1981)

(holding that a trial court "must avoid a strict proportionality" based on race and "fix boundaries
that are compact, contiguous and that preserve natural, political and traditional representation").
127. See, e.g., Jenkins v. City of Pensacola, 638 F.2d 1249, 1255 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that
"[als drawn the plan will permit blacks to elect a proportionate number of council members [and
since] [t]hat conforms to the ideal [it] will not be disturbed by this court"); Calderon v. McGee,
584 F.2d 66, 69 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding that "[e]lection of two minorities to a board consisting of
seven members would result in 28% minority representation and would reflect the approximate
28% minority population"); Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1977); Mississippi v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 569, 575, 582 (D.D.C. 1979).

128. E.g., Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398, 1413 (7th Cir. 1984); Smith v. Clinton, 687 F.
Supp. 1361, 1363 (E.D. Ark. 1988), aff'd mem. 109 S. Ct. 548 (1988); Rybicki v. State Bd. of Elections, 574 F. Supp. 1082, 1113 n.87 (N.D. Ill. 1982); see also Brace, Grofman, Handley & Niemi,
Minority Voting Equality: The 65 Percent Rule in Theory and Practice, 10 LAw & POL'Y 43

(1988).
129.

740 F.2d 1398 (7th Cir. 1984).
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fact provide them with a realistic opportunity to elect a representative
'130
of their choice.
2.

The "Complete Remedy" Standard

Congress resolved the matter of the propriety of creating majority
black districts as a remedy for vote dilution when it amended section 2
in 1982. According to the Senate report, "[t]he court should exercise its
traditional equitable powers to fashion the relief so that it completely
remedies the prior dilution of minority voting strength and fully provides equal opportunity for minority citizens to participate and to elect
candidates of their choice." 13 1 Voting cases cited in the report as exemplifying this "complete remedy and full opportunity" standard were
Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 2 and In re Illinois Congressional
Districts Reapportionment Cases. 3 3 Kirksey concerned the sufficiency
of a 1973 reapportionment plan for the Board of Supervisors of Hinds
County, Mississippi, which was adopted after the prior plan had been
invalidated on one person, one vote grounds. Although the county was
thirty-nine percent black, the new plan fragmented the geographically
concentrated minority community in the City of Jackson so that none
of the five supervisory districts contained a majority of voting age
blacks. The Fifth Circuit concluded that in the context of polarized voting in Hinds County the plan failed to provide minorities with a realistic opportunity to elect candidates of their choice, and that the district
court "as a matter of its remedy-fashioning power . . . could not approve a plan which tended to carry forward into the future the longlived denial of black access to the political process."'3 " The court also
confronted, and rejected, the argument that majority black districts
would constitute an unlawful racial gerrymander.13 5 In reaching this
conclusion the court relied on United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburg, Inc. v. Carey,3 6 in which the Supreme Court held that a
state may properly take race into account in reapportionment to create
majority nonwhite districts as long as it does not stigmatize or fence out
a racial minority or dilute its voting strength. In re Illinois Congressional Districts Reapportionment Cases similarly approved the use of
sixty-five percent minority voting districts for congressional reappor130.
131.
208-09.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 1413.
S. REP. No. 417, supra note 24, at 31, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE, supra note 24, at
554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1977).
No. 81-C-3915 (N.D. Ill. 1981), aff'd sub noma.
Kirksey, 554 F.2d at 152.
Id.
430 U.S. 144 (1977); see id. at 165.

Ryan v. Otto, 454 U.S. 1130 (1982).
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tionment in Illinois.

That adoption of the "complete remedy and full opportunity" standard for section 2 violations validated the use of effective minority districts is apparent from subsequent decisions applying the statute. In
Gingles v. Edmisten,13 7 citing both Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors and
In re Illinois CongressionalDistrictsReapportionment Cases, a district
court concluded that Congress in amending section 2 "necessarily took
into account and rejected as unfounded, or assumed as outweighed, the
risk that creating 'safe' black-majority single member districts would
perpetuate . . . racial polarization in voting behavior. 1 38 Similarly, in
United States v. Marengo County Commission,"s9 Judge Wisdom noted
that in light of amended section 2, states were now obligated to provide
"opportunities for effective participation by racial and language minorities," and suggested that such opportunities might be provided voluntarily through limited, cumulative or transferable preferential voting. 40
Thornburg v. Gingles removed any lingering doubt about the propriety
of majority nonwhite districts. The Supreme Court held that such districts are legally required when they can provide a remedy for the dilution effect of multimember districting."4

Included in the final version of amended section 2 was the so-called
"Dole compromise," a proportional representation disclaimer authored
by Senator Robert Dole of Kansas, which stated that nothing in section
2 established "a right to have members of a protected class elected in
numbers equal to their proportion in the population.'

142

According to

the Senate report, the purpose of the disclaimer was to make clear that
at-large elections were not unlawful per se, that minorities could not
establish a violation of section 2 merely by showing that they had not
been elected to office in proportion to their numbers in the population,
and that minorities were not entitled to racial quotas for office holding. 14 Congress reinforced the intendment of section 2 by adopting si137. 590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984).
138. Id. at 356-57 (noting that Congress considered the risk that the "recognition of group
voting rights was alien to the American political tradition").
139. 731 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1984).
140. Id. at 1560 & n.24.
141. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51 n.17.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1982); S. REP. No. 417, supra note 24, at 193-95, reprinted in 1982
U.S. CODE, supra note 24, at 363-66; see also H.R. REP. No. 227, supra note 24, at 30 (providing
that the proposed results standard "does not create a right of proportional representation").
143. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 24, at 23-24, 27, 31, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE, supra note
24, at 200-01, 204-05, 208-09 (stating that the disclaimer "puts to rest any concerns that have been
voiced about racial quotas"); id. at 16, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE, supra note 24, at 193 (explaining that the purpose of the disclaimer was to articulate the consensus of Congress "that the test for
Section 2 claims should not be whether members of a protected class have achieved proportional
representation") (additional views of Senator Robert Dole).
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multaneously the multistep White-Zimmer analysis for claims of vote

dilution, and the requirement that remedies for section 2 violations be
complete and provide minorities full access to the political process.
The Supreme Court confirmed this interpretation of the proportional representation disclaimer in Thornburg v. Gingles. It noted that
the Senate report limited the circumstances under which a section 2
violation could be found in three ways: at-large elections are not considered per se unlawful, "the conjunction of an allegedly dilutive electoral
mechanism and the lack of proportional representation alone does not
establish a violation," and the existence of polarized voting may not be
consistently
assumed by a court. 4 4 This construction has been applied
145

by the lower federal courts in other section 2 cases.
Majority nonwhite districts do not guarantee, or set quotas for, minority office holding and thus do not provide proportional representation as the phrase was used in the disclaimer and the legislative history.
They merely afford minorities a proportional opportunity to elect candidates of their choice-of whatever race. Proportional, or equal, opportunity is not only consistent with, but is required by, section 2, the
Constitution, and American democratic traditions.
C. The Red Herring of Resegregation
Opponents of majority nonwhite districts have claimed that, proportional representation aside, the districts are undesirable for various
reasons of policy. During the 1981 congressional reapportionment in
Georgia, for example, a member of the general assembly criticized a
plan introduced by Senator Julian Bond creating a sixty-nine percent
black fifth congressional district because "[i]t brings out resegregation
in a fine county like Fulton and resegregation in a fine city like Atlanta."'14 6 The plan, he said, would disrupt the "'harmonious working

relationship between the races'" and would cause polarization and
"'white flight.' ,,147 Other members said that a majority black congressional district would be merely a black ghetto. 48 One of the black mem144. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46.
145. See Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 355 & n.13 (E.D.N.C. 1984) (stating that the
"limit of the intended meaning of the disclaimer in amended Section 2" is that "the fact that
blacks have not been elected under a challenged districting plan in numbers proportional to their
percentage of the population" does not alone establish vote dilution); see also Buchanan v. City of
Jackson, 683 F. Supp. 1515, 1521 (W.D. Tenn. 1988); McNeil v. City of Springfield, 658 F. Supp.
1015, 1018 (C.D. Ill. 1987).
146. Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 507 (D.D.C. 1982).
147. Id.
148. Id.; see Fund, Voting Law Hurts Blacks, Helps GOP, Wall St. J., Dec. 21, 1987, at 18,

col. 4 (commenting that majority black districts bear "resemblance to the justly criticized example
of black Zimbabwe, which until this year was required to have 20 of its 100 seats in parliament
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hers of the general assembly, suggesting that the opposition was racially
biased, defended the Bond plan and charged that no one seemed concerned about "working relations" in the other nine majority white congressional districts. Opponents expressed racial concerns only about the
single district in which whites would constitute the minority.'4 9
The general assembly rejected the Bond proposal and instead
adopted a plan that divided the black population in the metropolitan
Atlanta area among several congressional districts and thus minimized
the percentage of minorities in the fifth district. The state sought section 5 preclearance of the plan but preclearance was denied. The District of Columbia court characterized opposition to the Bond plan as
"based solely on race' ' 15 and concluded that the adopted plan "has a
discriminatory purpose in violation of Section 5."' 5 1 As the battle over
congressional reapportionment in Georgia demonstrates, much of the
stated hostility to effective minority voting districts is a rationalization
for maintaining the status quo or simply a mask for racist opposition to
minority political participation. That is evident in other cases in which
courts have invalidated at-large systems on the grounds of purposeful
discrimination.1 52
Congress, moreover, considered similar arguments that the amendment of section 2 and the implementation of districting remedies in
vote dilution cases would be against public policy. 5 ' Congress weighed
reserved for whites"); Schuck, What Went Wrong With the Voting Rights Act, WASH. MONTHLY,
Nov. 1987, at 51 (noting that majority nonwhite districts are "a paternalistic policy of electoral
apartheid"); see also A. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES CoUNT?: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY
VOTING RIGHTS 242-44 (1987).
149. Busbee, 549 F. Supp. at 507.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 517.
152. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp.
1050, 1077 (S.D. Ala. 1982).
153. See, e.g., Voting Rights Act Hearings,supra note 66, at 511 (statement of Dr. Edward J.
Erler) (warning that a results standard "may allow the racial minority to become isolated"); id. at
662 (statement of John H. Bunzel) (stating that a results standard would "deepen the tensions,
fragmentation and outright resentment among racial groups"); id. at 745 (statement of Michael
Levin) (warning that a results standard would "pit race against race"); id. at 1115 (statement of
Robert M. Brinson) (arguing that a results standard would "tend strongly to stigmatize minorities,
to compartmentalize the electorate, to reinforce any arguable voting syndrome, and to prevent
minority members from exercising influence on the political system beyond the bounds of their
quota"); id. at 1250 (statement of Prof. Henry Abraham) (contending that a results standard
"would enhance, that this would exacerbate, race consciousness"); id. at 1328 (statement of Donald
L. Horowitz) (stating that a results standard "may well foster polarization"); id. at 1335 (statement
of Prof. James F. Blumstein) (contending that a results standard "reduces the incentives for interracial coalition formation"); id. at 1449 (letter from Prof. William Van Alstyne) (warning that a
results standard would "compel the worst tendencies toward race-based allegiances and
divisions").
Members of the Senate subcommittee similarly argued that adoption of a results standard for
§ 2 would lead to the creation of "political ghettos for minorities" and that "minority influence
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these arguments, assessed the risks involved, and judged that the
amendments were justified and necessary to combat continuing racial
discrimination and polarization in the electorate.15 According to the

Senate report, the testimony, and other evidence presented to the subcommittee belied the predictions and speculations that the amendment
of section 2 would be a divisive factor that would polarize communities
on the basis of race. 155 Numerous courts had applied the results test
prior to 1980 and the decision in Bolden, and none of the dire consequences predicted by the opponents of the 1982 amendment had occurred. "There is, in short, an extensive, reliable and reassuring track
record of court decisions using the very standard which the Committee
bill would codify. The witnesses who attacked the 'result standard' virtually ignored those decisions in their analysis and, in most cases, admitted

unfamiliarity with them, as

well.' 1

56

The subcommittee

concluded that criticism of the application of the results standard in
racially polarized jurisdictions was "like saying that it is the doctor's
thermometer which causes high fever.' 1 57 Because Congress rejected

these arguments and speculations when it enacted the amendments to
the Act in 1982, they are no longer factors to consider in vote dilution
cases under section 2.158

The available evidence, while not extensive, supports the conclusion that effective minority voting districts do not create racial isolation
would suffer enormously." S. REP. No. 417, supra note 24, at 103, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE,
supra note 24, at 276 (emphasis in original) (additional views of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch of Utah).
154. Unlike the 1965 Act, there was no broad or regionally based opposition to the 1982
amendments. To the extent that there was opposition, it primarily came from the Administration,
a few members of Congress, and a coterie of academicians. Foster, PoliticalSymbols and the En-

actment of the 1982 Voting Rights Act, in THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT. CONSEQUENCES
TIONS 85, 102 (L. Foster ed. 1985) [hereinafter CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS].

AND IMPLICA-

155. S.REP. No. 417, supra note 24, at 31-32, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE, supra note 24, at
208-10.
156. Id. at 32, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE, supra note 24, at 209-10.
157. Id. at 34, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE, supra note 24, at 212.
158. The district court in Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984), took special note of the action taken by Congress and rejected for the same reasons similar objections
raised to invalidating North Carolina's legislative reapportionment. The court stated:
Congress necessarily took into account and rejected as unfounded, or assumed as outweighed,
several risks to fundamental political values that opponents of the amendment urged in committee deliberations and floor debate. Among these were the risk that the judicial remedy
might actually be at odds with the judgment of significant elements in the racial minority; the
risk that creating "safe" black-majority single member districts would perpetuate racial ghettos and racial polarization in voting behavior; the risk that reliance upon the judicial remedy
would supplant the normal, more healthy processes of acquiring political power by registration, voting and coalition building; and the fundamental risk that the recognition of "group
voting rights" and the imposing of affirmative obligation upon government to secure those
rights by race-conscious electoral mechanisms was alien to the American political tradition.
Id. at 356-57 (footnotes omitted).
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or disserve the interests of racial minorities. Existing social science data

confirm what common sense and the anecdotal evidence indicate-that
the increased minority office holding associated with single member districts has also been associated with a substantial shift in responsiveness
to minority interests and the inclusion of minorities in decisionmaking. s' A recent study of ten cities in California found that minority
political participation, facilitated by single member districts, was "associated with important changes in urban policy-the creation of police
review boards, the appointment[] of more minorities to commissions,
the increasing use of minority contractors, and a general increase in the
number of programs oriented to minorities." 160 The report also found
that the mere presence of black and Hispanic council members tended
to break down polarization and racial stereotyping and "has increased
minority access to councils and changed decision-making processes."''
A 1979 study in Alabama likewise found "a causal relationship between growth and black political participation and policy change: the
greater the change in political participation, the greater the change in
social welfare policy."' 6 2 A study of Newark concluded that under a
black mayor "[in]ore blacks were appointed to higher offices as well as
employed throughout the city government," and that there was a
strengthening of the city human rights
commission and the implemen63
tation of affirmative action policies.

Black officials generally confirm the findings in these reports. Tom
McCain, the first black county administrator in the history of Edgefield
County, South Carolina, gave the following example of the significance
of increased black political participation and office holding at the most
basic level of county services. "Before blacks held elected office, the
159.

Morris, Black Electoral Participationand the Distributionof Public Benefits, in THE
VOTE 164, 180 (Rockefeller Found. 1981) [hereinafter Morris]. And responsiveness aside,
increased minority office holding enhances ethnic pride and dignity, underscores the legitimacy of
elected government, and is a visible sign that public office is not reserved for whites only. A.
THERNSTROM, supra note 148, at 239-40.
160. R. BROWNING, D. MARSHALL & D. TABS, PROTEST Is NOT ENOUGH 168 (1984).
161. Id. at 141, 168.
162. Hamilton, supra note 8, in MINORITY REPORT, supra note 8, at 14-15 (quoting Sanders,
New Voters and New Policy Prioritiesin the Deep South: A Decade of PoliticalChange in Alabama, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association,
Washington, D.C. (August 1979)).
163. Yatrakis, Electoral Demands and Political Benefits: Minority as Majority, A Case
Study of Two Newark Elections 1970, 1974 (Ph.D. diss. Columbia Univ., 1981) (source on file at
Columbia Univ.). Other studies reach similar conclusions. See, e.g., H. GOSNELL, NEGRO POLITICIANS: THE RISE OF NEGRO POLITICS IN CHICAGO 367-68 (1935); W. KEECH, THE IMPACT OF NEGRO
VOTING: THE ROLE OF THE VOTE IN THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY 93-94 (1968) (asserting that black
electoral participation brought changes in the outcome of elections and the distribution of services
in Tuskegee, Alabama and Durham, North Carolina), cited in Morris, supra note 159 (citing Eisinger, Black Employment in Municipal Jobs: The Impact of Black PoliticalPower, 26-27).
RIGHT TO
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county always picked up white folk's garbage and sometimes it picked
up black folk's garbage. Now, we just pick up the garbage."' 6 4 Carl Eggleston, the first black elected to the Farmville, Virginia city council
says that "[o]ne of the main benefits of black office holding is that it
allows us to be a part of what is taking place and to know what is going
on. Before, we didn't.116 5 Eggleston was a leader in a successful attempt
to block a proposed city tax on food which would have had a disproportionate impact on black and poor residents.' 6
Aside from local politics, the impact of increased minority political
participation nationally often has been dramatic. In 1975, for the first
time since Reconstruction, a majority of the white members of Congress
from the South supported, on final passage, a major civil rights
bill-the 1975 amendments to the Voting Rights Act. This watershed
political event can be traced directly to the increased participation of
blacks in the region's electoral process. 16 7 The same can be said of
southern congressional support for the 1982 amendments of the Voting
Rights Act, as well as support for the Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1987 and the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988.168 The members
of Congress from Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas cast 158 votes (seventynine percent) for, and only 41 votes against, the two 1988 civil rights
bills. 6 9
164. Interview with Tom McCain in Edgefield, South Carolina (July 8, 1988).
165. McDonald, Votes of Confidence, FOUND. NEWS, Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 27, 31.
166. Id. There is even evidence, although tentative and anecdotal, that increased minority
political participation is breaking down patterns of racial polarization and bloc voting. In 1986, as
the result of reapportionment and the creation of a majority black district in the Delta area of the
state, Mike Espy became the first black elected to Congress from Mississippi since Reconstruction.
He received just 10% of the white vote and 52% of the vote overall. In 1988 he won re-election
with 40% of the white vote and 66% of the vote overall, a remarkable and encouraging showing in
a state which traditionally has taken the lead in discrimination against blacks. Republicans Push
"Hot Button" Issues, 16 S.ExPOSURE, Winter 1988, at 5, 7.
167. Black, Racial Composition of CongressionalDistricts and Support for Federal Voting
Rights Legislation in the American South, 59 Soc. Sci. Q. 435, 448-49 (1978); Stern, Legislative
Responsiveness and the New Southern Politics, in

CONSEQUENCES AND

IMPLICATIONS, supra note

154, at 105, 114, 117-18 (stating that "[t]he shift in southern congressional voting on black rights
issues is a manifestation of the black suffrage extension in recent years").
168. The Civil Rights Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988), which
passed the House by a vote of 315 to 98 and the Senate by a vote of 75 to 14, was enacted in
response to Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). The Act provided that civil rights laws
protecting minorities, the aged and the disabled apply to an entire institution-not just to the
program or activity receiving federal funds. The Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat.
1619 (1988), which strengthened enforcement of fair housing laws and extended coverage to the
disabled and families with children, passed the House by a vote of 376 to 23 and the Senate by a
vote of 94 to 3. See Special Report, Congressional Voting Records, Civ. LIBERTIES ALERT, Nov.
1988, at 4-9, 12-18.
169. See supra note 168.
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Another important example of the increasing influence of black political participation upon national decisionmaking was the 1987 rejection by the Senate of the Supreme Court nomination of Robert Bork,
who was regarded by minorities as being soft on civil rights. 170 Judge
Bork needed the votes of such southern senators as Howell Heflin and
Richard Shelby of Alabama, John Breaux of Louisiana, and Sam Nunn
of Georgia. He did not get them, perhaps because those Senators, although generally regarded as conservative, owed their elections in large
part to black voters who would have been alienated by support of Judge
Bork's confirmation. Those "no" votes from the South would have been
17
unthinkable twenty years ago. '
D.

The Quickened Pace and Expanded Scope of Litigation After
1982

The amendment of section 2 and the decision in Rogers v. Lodge in
1982, together with the Gingles decision in 1986, represented a strong
congressional and judicial commitment to equality in voting and the
support of vote dilution claims. They also accelerated the pace of voting
rights litigation. This was a secondary, but critical, benefit to the voting
rights revolution.
In the past, vote dilution cases often were endlessly litigated, with
numerous appeals and remands for further consideration of the various
White-Zimmer factors. Judges frequently viewed the same, or nearly
the same, evidence and reached opposite conclusions. 72 In addition,
proving dilution was expensive and time consuming. This severely limited the number of discriminatory practices the minority and civil
rights community could challenge."' As a practical matter, a plaintiff's
170. Disputed Court Nominee Promises No Surprises, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1988, at B8,
col. 1.
171. Neuborne, Disfranchisingthe Poor, Civ. L ERTIES, Spring-Summer 1988, at 10 (reviewing F. PIVEN, WHY AMERICANS DON'T VOTE (1988)). Bork got the vote of just one of the 17 white

Democratic senators from the states of the old Confederacy, Senator Hollings of South Carolina.
Hollings, in what appeared to be an act of penitence over his support of Bork, later endorsed the
Rev. Jesse Jackson as the Democratic Party's nominee for President. He was the only one of the
southern Democratic senators to do so.
172. See, e.g., Cross v. Baxter, 604 F.2d 875 (5th Cir. 1979), af'd, 639 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir.
Unit B Mar. 1981), modified, 688 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 460 U.S. 1065
(1983); Nevett v. Sides, 533 F.2d 1361 (5th Cir. 1976), af'd after remand, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir.
1978).
173. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), for example, took eight years to litigate
and the plaintiffs' lawyers spent 5525 hours and approximately $96,000 in out-of-pocket costs to
prosecute the case. Bolden v. City of Mobile, Civ. No. 75-297-P (S.D. Ala. Dec. 12, 1983) (order on
attorneys' fees and expenses). McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236 (1984), a challenge to at-large
elections in Edgefield County, South Carolina, took more than 10 years to litigate. The plaintiffs'
lawyers spent in excess of 1651 hours on the case and had $14,928 in direct expenses. McCain v.
Lybrand, Civ. No. 74-281 (D.S.C. Apr. 13, 1987) (order on fees and costs). In a similar suit against

1280

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:1249

burden in a dilution case was to demonstrate the importance of race in
every aspect of the public and private life of the challenged jurisdiction.
Hundreds of hours were required to make a record of historical and
continuing discrimination or polarization in voting, employment, public
accommodations, appointments to boards and commissions, provision
of services, police practices, jury selection, housing, social and business
organizations, churches, and political associations. Historians, demographers, statisticians, political scientists and engineers, among others, had
the relevant evidence and
to be consulted in gathering and analyzing
17 4
were regularly used as expert witnesses.

Prior to the adoption of the results standard in 1982, voting cases
were brought in federal court at the rate of about 150 a year. Since
then, with the streamlining and greater predictability of dilution challenges, the number has jumped to about 225 a year. 75 As a result of the
increase in litigation, and the threat of litigation, more jurisdictions
have abandoned their at-large elections and adopted district voting. According to the Department of Justice, in the three years prior to 1982,
fewer than six hundred jurisdictions in the covered states changed their
method of election. In the three years following the amendment of section 2 the number rose to 1354.176
As these figures suggest, voting cases are being settled at a much
greater rate than in the past. Edgefield County, South Carolina is illustrative. The first vote dilution challenge was filed against the county
council in 1974 and was litigated for more than ten years, including an
the board of education, Jackson v. Edgefield County School District, 650 F. Supp. 1176 (D.S.C.
1986), plaintiffs' lawyers spent 806 hours in the district court on trial and pretrial proceedings and
had $35,795 in expenses. Jackson v. Edgefield County School Dist., Civ. No. 9:85-709-3 (D.S.C.
July 27, 1987) (order on fees and costs). In Windy Boy v. County of Big Horn, 647 F. Supp. 1002
(D. Mont. 1986), a challenge to at-large elections in Big Horn County, Montana brought by members of the Crow and Northern Cheyenne Tribes, the plaintiffs' lawyers spent 767 hours in the
district court and had expenses in the amount of $17,641. Windy Boy v. County of Big Horn, No.
CV 83-225-BLG-ER (D. Mont. Jan. 28, 1987). In NAACP v. City of Dover, Civ. No. 85-230-JLL
(D. Del. Oct. 28, 1988), even though the case was settled well in advance of trial, the plaintiffs'
lawyers still spent 335 hours in preparation and had approximately $28,000 in expenses.
174. In recognition of the complexity of voting rights litigation, a 1980 survey of federal district court judges gave voting cases a weight of 2.8420. An average case was weighted 1.000 on a
scale that measured the complexity and amount of judicial resources different categories of cases
needed. Only 10 of the 55 categories listed in the survey exceeded voting cases in complexity.
DIRECTOR OF ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT A-161 table X-2

(1980) [hereinafter 1980 ANNUAL COURT REPORT]; see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301, 314 (1966) (noting that voting cases "are unusually onerous to prepare").
175. DIRECTOR OF ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT table C-2
(1979-1988) [hereinafter 1979-1988 ANNUAL COURT REPORT].
176. Cwm RIGHTS DIv., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ENFORCING THE LAW, VOTING 2 (Jan. 20, 1981Jan. 31, 1987) [hereinafter VOTING]. In addition to litigation, state laws requiring district elections
have also contributed to the changes in the form of local governments. See, e.g., 1978 Tenn. Pub.
Acts ch. 934, § 8 (requiring district elections for county legislative bodies).
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appeal to the Supreme Court. 17 7 A similar suit was filed against the
county school board in 1985. Following the decision in Gingles, and a
trial court decision for the plaintiffs, the defendants decided not to appeal. 8 Vote dilution suits were then filed against the two largest towns
in the county, Johnston and Edgefield, and both municipalities settled
79
without going to trial.1
80
Dillard v. Crenshaw County,1
a challenge by blacks to at-large
elections in the nine counties in Alabama that used such procedures
and were not already subject to federal lawsuits, also illustrates the
quickened pace of voting rights litigation and the increased willingness
of defendants to settle. Three of the nine counties reached full agreement with the plaintiffs shortly after the litigation was begun.' s ' Following the issuance of a preliminary injunction by the district court,
three additional counties reached a full settlement and the remaining
three reached partial settlements.8 2 In granting injunctive relief the
court concluded that the adoption of the at-large systems by the state
legislature was "racially inspired" and that a state-wide numbered place
law enacted in 1961 was for the purpose of reshaping the at-large sys' 3
tems into "more secure mechanisms for discrimination. 18
The prior finding by the district court of intentional discrimination
at the state level, which had been affirmed on appeal, clearly placed in
doubt the continued legality of at-large elections anywhere in the state.
The plaintiffs in Dillard accordingly amended their complaint to add
183 cities, counties, and county school boards that used at-large elections, alleging that they too were tainted by the racially inspired enactments of the Alabama legislature. All but seven of the jurisdictions
177. McCain, 465 U.S. 236; see also supra note 173 (documenting plaintiffs' lawyers' hours
and expenses).
178. Jackson, 650 F. Supp. 1176.
179. Jackson v. Johnston, Civ. No. 9:87-955-3 (D.S.C. Sept. 30, 1987); Thomas v. Mayor of
Edgefield, Civ. No. 9:86-2901-16 (D.S.C. May 27, 1987).
180. 649 F. Supp 289 (M.D. Ala. 1986), aff'd in part, remanded in part, 831 F.2d 246 (11th
Cir. 1987).
181. Dillard, 649 F. Supp. at 291.
182. The counties reaching partial settlement admitted liability under § 2 but argued that
their retention of an at-large elected commission chair was permitted under the statute. The district court disagreed and enjoined the use of any at-large elected positions. Id. at 292, 298-99. Only
one of the three counties appealed, and on appeal the district court was affirmed. Dillard,831 F.2d
at 252-53. The county argued that the chairperson was a single-member office such as a sheriff or a
tax collector and thus not subject to proportional representation. The court of appeals, however,
concluded that the chairperson was more directly tied to the work of the county commission and
could not be treated as a single-office position. Under those circumstances the retention of at-large
voting would not "with certitude completely remedy the Section 2 violation." Id. at 252 (emphasis
in original). On remand the county adopted a system of rotating the chair among the five associate
commissioners. Dillard, 679 F. Supp. at 1547.
183. Dillard, 640 F. Supp. at 1361, 1357; see also supra notes 26-32.
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entered into an interim consent decree agreeing to a resolution of the
plaintiffs' claims in the district court.""
In addition to the increase in the number of voting rights cases
being brought and the jurisdictions affected, the scope of the litigation
has been broadened. Section 2's prohibition of vote dilution has been
expressly held to cover the election of judges. It seems equally clear
that the statute applies to the election of any public official in which
the vote dilution is corrigible.
Defendant jurisdictions have argued that section 2, like the one
person, one vote rule, applies only to the election of legislators and that
judicial officials do not "serve" a constituency in the same way that representatives do. 185 These arguments have been rejected by the appellate
courts considering them. In Chisom v. Edwards, 8 for example, the
court held that the "plain language" of the Act provided that section 2
was to apply to the election of any candidate for public office, including
judges. The court found further support for its position in the "absence
of any legislative history" of the 1982 amendments warranting a contrary conclusion, and in the holding of the courts and the Attorney
General that section 5 of the Act applies to voting changes affecting the
election of judges. 87 Similarly, in Dillard v. Crenshaw County,188 the
court of appeals rejected the suggestion that elected administrative positions are excluded from section 2 coverage. According to the court,
"[n]owhere in the language of Section 2 nor in the legislative history
does Congress condition the applicability of Section 2 on the function
performed by an elected official."' 89
E. Strategies for a Complete Remedy
The recent increases in minority office holding can be traced, not
simply to formal access to the ballot, but directly to the creation of
184. Dillard v. Baldwin County Bd. of Ed., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1461 (M.D. Ala. 1988). The
parties later agreed that the court should treat 165 of the jurisdictions as individual lawsuits with
separate files and civil action numbers. Id.
185. In Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453, 455 (M.D. La. 1972) (citing Buchanan v. Rhodes,
249 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Ohio 1960)), afl'd, 409 U.S. 1095 (1973), the district court held that judges
do not represent people but serve them. As a consequence the rationale that one person, one vote
preserves a representative form of government did not apply to the judiciary. Id.; accord Voter
Information Project, Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge, 612 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1980).
186. 839 F.2d 1056, 1060 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Roemer v. Chisom, 109 S. Ct. 390

(1988).
187. Id. at 1061-64 (emphasis in original) (citing Haith v. Martin, 618 F. Supp. 410, 413
(E.D.N.C. 1985), af'd, 477 U.S. 901 (1986), and Kirksey v. Allain, 635 F. Supp. 347, 349 (S.D. Miss.
1986)); accord Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1988); Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183
(S.D. Miss. 1987).
188. 831 F.2d 246 (11th Cir. 1987).
189. Id. at 251.
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effective minority electoral districts. 190 Single member districts, however, do not always provide an equal opportunity for racial minorities to
elect representatives of their choice, as where the minority population is
geographically dispersed. 191 In some cases, therefore, it may be desirable or necessary to adopt measures that do not rely exclusively on single
member districts, such as limited or cumulative voting, in order to provide the complete and full remedy for vote dilution mandated by Congress.1 9 2 In a limited voting system, the voter votes for fewer than the
number of seats to be filled. In a cumulative system, the voter may cast
a multiple vote for less than a full slate of candidates. 93 Both systems,
known as semi-proportional systems, enhance the opportunity for minority office holding where the minority population is too dispersed to
94
allow for the creation of a fair number of single member districts.
190. NAT'L ROSTER 1986, supra note 13, at 1, 5. In Mississippi and Alabama, for example,
every black in the state legislature was elected from a majority black district. McDonald, Votes of
Confidence, 29 FOUND. NEWS, Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 26, 31. In Big Horn County, Montana, the only
Indian who has served on the county commission was elected from a majority-Indian district. Id.
In Georgia, of the six black state senators and 22 representatives, only one, Michael Thurmond
(D.-Athens), was elected from a majority white district. Blacks Fighting To Gain Six Seats, Atlanta Const., July 3, 1988, at 1B, col. 6, at 4B, col. 4. In those cities and counties in Texas that
have adopted single member districts or redrawn district lines "[t]he results have in all cases been
favorable to ethnic minorities: registration, voter turnout, and minority representation have increased." D. MONTEJANO, ANGLOS AND MEXICANS IN THE MAKING OF TEXAS, 1836-1986, at 293
(1987).
191. See B. CAIN, supra note 37, at 36-37; Grofman, supra note 95, at 160; Still, Alternatives
to Single Member Districts, in VoTE DILUTION, supra note 26, at 249.
192. See S. REP. No. 417, supra note 24, at 31, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE, supra note 24, at
208-09 (stating that the court should exercise its traditional equitable powers to remedy completely the prior dilution of minority voting strength).
193.

See R.

DIXON, DEMOCRATIc REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS

523-25 (1968); E.

LAKEMAN, How DEMOCRACIES VOTE: A STUDY OF MAJORITY AND PROPORTIONAL
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 85-88 (1970); Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Com-

pactness in Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 223-36 (1989); Note, Alternative Voting Systems as Remedies for Unlawful At-Large Systems, 92 YALE L.J. 144, 148-49, 153-54
(1982).
194. One court has ruled that these remedies are required when a districting remedy is incomplete, but the decision was overturned on appeal. In McGhee v. Granville County, 860 F.2d
110, 115 (4th Cir. 1988), the court of appeals reversed a district court order requiring the use of
limited voting when all single member districts, because of the dispersion of the minority population, did not completely remedy the existing vote dilution. The appellate court reasoned that since
the plaintiffs challenged an existing geographical districting system, their remedy was limited to a
new geographical districting system. See id. at 118. When the use of a geographical districting
system itself was alleged and found to cause vote dilution, however, McGhee, at least on its face,
would not appear to be an obstacle to the use of limited or cumulative voting. The fortuity of
population dispersion logically should not be a basis for curbing the broad equitable powers of the
courts to fashion effective remedies for voting rights violation. See Carrollton Branch of NAACP v.
Stallings, 829 F.2d 1547 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Duncan v. Carrollton, 108 S. Ct.
1111 (1988) (reversing a district court's holding against plaintiffs who challenged a single county
commissioner form of government, and remanding the case for proper application of Gingles standards); cf. McNeil v. Springfield Park Dist., 851 F.2d 937, 946 (7th Cir. 1988) (requiring the minor-
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Limited and cumulative voting, despite claims that they are exotic
procedures antithetical to American traditions, often have been used in
the United States 195 and have consistently withstood constitutional

challenges. 6 They also have been adopted in a number of recent consent decrees in section 2 cases challenging at-large elections and have
been precleared by the Attorney General.1 97 Where limited and cumulative voting have been implemented they have been shown to be an effective remedy for section 2 violations, and there is no evidence that
they have had an adverse effect on local politics or undermined American democratic traditions. 198
IV.

A.

VOTING RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT

The Department of Justice

The Department of Justice has broad powers and duties under the
Voting Rights Act, including reviewing submissions of voting changes
under section 5, assigning federal examiners and observers of elections
and conducting various litigation activities.'99 As part of its litigation
program the Department may bring affirmative suits to enforce the voting laws and by statute must defend section 5 preclearance and bail-out
suits brought in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The
Department also must defend challenges to the constitutionality of acts
of Congress, including the Voting Rights Act.200
ity group to constitute a majority in a single-member district and denying plaintiffs' requests for
the addition of seats to the park and school boards).
195. As noted in Grofman, supra note 95, at 163-64, New York, Boston, and Indianapolis
occasionally have used limited voting since 1870. Pennsylvania and Connecticut use it extensively
for county and school board elections. Conecuh County, Alabama adopted limited voting in 1982.
Cumulative voting was used in several jurisdictions in Illinois until 1980.
196. See Cintron-Garcia v. Romero-Barcelo, 671 F.2d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1982); Orloski v. Davis,
564 F. Supp. 526, 529-30 (M.D. Pa. 1983); LoFrisco v. Schafer, 341 F. Supp. 743, 749 (D. Conn.),
afl'd, 409 U.S. 972 (1972).
197. See, e.g., Harry v. Bladen County, Civ. No. 87-72-CIV-7 (E.D.N.C. April 21, 1988);
United States v. City of Augusta, Civ. No. CV 187-004 (S.D. Ga. July 22, 1988).
198. See Affidavit of Jerome A. Gray, Field Director of the Alabama Democratic Conference
(Sept. 22, 1988) (source on file with Author) (reporting that either limited or cumulative voting
was adopted by consent in 27 jurisdictions in Dillardv. CrenshawCounty, and 17 black candidates
were elected in the 16 jurisdictions where blacks qualified to run for city council seats). Gray concluded that
the tremendous success rate in which black candidates were elected under these new systems
attests that they are yet another effective way to remedy Section 2 violations of at-large elections, especially in localities where it is impractical to draw districts or where the black population may be too dispersed, but where there is still a definite minority community of interest.
Id.
199. VOTING, supra note 176, at 1.
200. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973a-1973c (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (1982).
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Section 5

The record of the Reagan Administration in reviewing section 5
submissions has been erratic at best." 1 Although the Department has
objected to many potentially discriminatory voting changes, its overall
objection rate is lower than previous administrations'. During the second term of the Nixon Administration and the Ford and Carter Administrations (1971-1980), the average rate of section 5 objections was 3.87
percent per year. During the first seven years of the Reagan Administration, the average rate dropped to 1.02 percent.20 2 This decline no
doubt reflects to some extent the deterrent effect of section 5, but the
record also shows that a number of submissions precleared by the Department were later invalidated by the courts. In 1982, for example, the
Attorney General precleared North Carolina's legislative reapportionment, Louisiana's congressional reapportionment, and Montgomery, Alabama's council apportionment, concluding that they had no adverse
racial purpose or effect. The federal courts later set aside major portions of all three plans on the grounds that they diluted minority voting
strength in violation of section 2 of the Act.20 3
The problem with section 5 enforcement has not been with the professional or career staff but with the Administration's political appointees. The Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights frequently has
overruled his staff and made section 5 decisions for political reasons. At
the confirmation hearings on his appointment to be Associate Attorney
201. The administration of § 5 historically was problematic for a number of reasons. During
the early years under the Johnson Administration (1965-1968), the Department of Justice placed
very little emphasis on § 5, and the covered jurisdictions complied only minimally. Under President Nixon, the Attorney General advocated repeal of § 5 and in practice excluded annexations
and redistricting from coverage. Systematic compliance with the preclearance requirement only
began after the Supreme Court authoritatively construed the scope of § 5 and the allocation of the
burden of proof in Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), and Perkins v. Matthews,
400 U.S. 379 (1971), and after the Attorney General issued guidelines for the administration of § 5.
Procedures for the Administration of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 30 Fed. Reg. 18,186 (1971)
(codified at 28 C.F.R. § 51.1 (1988)). Even then, many jurisdictions continued to flout the statute.
For a discussion of past and continuing problems in § 5 enforcement, see H. BALL, D. KRANE & T.
LAUTH, COMPROMISED COMPLIANCE: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

1965

VOTING RIGHTS ACT

(1982); CoMP-

TROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, VOTING RIGHTS ACT-ENFORCEMENT NEEDS STRENGTHEN-

(1978); Days & Guinier, Enforcement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, in VoTE DILUTION,
supra note 26, at 167; McDonald, supra note 4, at 62-80.
202. F. PARKER, VOTING RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 26 (1989).
203. See Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 351 (E.D.N.C. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part sub nom. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325, 328
(E.D. La. 1983); Buskey v. Oliver, 565 F. Supp. 1473, 1484-85 (M.D. Ala. 1983); see also Nisby v.
ING

Commissioners Court, Civ. No. B-83-342-CA (E.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 1984) (setting aside a redistricting

plan under § 2 that was precleared by the Department of Justice). For a discussion of the role and
commitment of Department of Justice staff attorneys in enforcement of civil rights, see Selig, The
Reagan Justice Department and Civil Rights: What Went Wrong, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 185, 188.
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General, Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds testified that from 1981 to 1985 he overruled staff recommendations for section 5 objections at least thirty times.2"4 One case in which he overruled
his staff arose in Edgefield County, South Carolina. In that case, Reynolds denied the staff permission to file a district court brief (which previously had been prepared and approved) supporting the minority
plaintiffs in a section 5 enforcement action after he received complaints
from Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, who began his political career in Edgefield. 0 5 The Department similarly withdrew an objection to a municipal annexation in Jackson, Mississippi after receiving
complaints from Senator Thad Cochran of Mississippi and Representative Trent Lott of Mississippi.20 6 Based on these and other examples of
political interference with section 5 enforcement, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights issued a report in 1982 concluding that "the
Reagan Administration's Justice Department has permitted political
considerations to corrupt fair administration of the law."2 '
In other section 5 cases the Attorney General has either failed to
support minority plaintiffs who had meritorious claims or, as in Thornburg v. Gingles, actively opposed them. For example, in Blanding v.
Dubose,20 8 black residents of Sumter County, South Carolina brought

suit to enjoin at-large elections for the county council. The residents
alleged that the county failed to comply with a section 5 objection by
the Attorney General. Shortly after the suit was filed, the United States
filed a similar action and the two cases were consolidated. The issue in
the case was whether a letter from the county was a request for reconsideration or a new preclearance submission. The letter informed the
Attorney General that a subsequent referendum had been held approving at-large council elections. If the letter was a new submission, as the
county argued, the failure of the Attorney General to interpose a new
objection within sixty days would result in preclearance of the voting
change. The three judge court agreed with the county and granted it
summary judgment. The district court's opinion allowed a jurisdiction
to circumvent section 5 by readopting a contested voting practice and
204. Nomination of William Bradford Reynolds to be Associate Attorney General of the
United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 448
(1985).
205. Justice Department Withdraws Support in Edgefield Case, The State (Columbia,
S.C.), Sept. 14. 1981, at 1B, col. 4.
206. Cochran-Lott, One-two Punch Attack Stirs Controversy in Federal Agencies, ClarionLedger (Jackson, Miss.), July 22, 1981, at Al, col. 3.
207. LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CivIL RIGHTS, WITHOUT JUSTICE: A REPORT ON THE CONDUCT
OF THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT IN CIvIL RIGHTS IN 1981-82, at 65 (1982). F. PARKER, supra note 202,
at 14-15.
208. 509 F. Supp. 1334, 1335-37 (D.S.C. 1981), rev'd, 454 U.S. 393 (1982).
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merely advising the Department of Justice of its action, but without
specifically requesting preclearance. The Attorney General refused to
appeal, acquiescing in this restrictive interpretation of section 5. The
minority plaintiffs did appeal, however, and the Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous per curiam opinion. °9
In a case from predominantly black Greene County, Alabama,
Hardy v. Wallace,2 1 ° the Attorney General similarly retreated from section 5 enforcement. The Department originally objected to a statute
providing for the appointment by the governor, rather than by the
county's legislative delegation, of members of the county racing commission. The change was triggered by the likely election, under a new
apportionment, of blacks to Greene County's house and senate districts.
The Attorney General, following a request for reconsideration, withdrew the objection and ruled that the change was not within the scope
of section 5. Minority plaintiffs challenged the new statute and a threejudge court enjoined its use, holding that it was subject to section 5
review.
2.

Proposed Revision of the Section 5 Guidelines

The Department of Justice not only opposed the twenty-five year
extension of preclearance in 1982,211 but also published a proposed revision of procedures for the administration of section 5212 that would have
watered down section 5 enforcement. The revisions, which were strongly
criticized by the civil rights community,2 13 reflected a narrow or erroneous reading of intervening court decisions and congressional intent in
extending and amending the Act in 1982, and failed to incorporate decisions that had strengthened the Act. More particularly, the revisions
209. Blanding v. Dubose, 454 U.S. 393 (1982) (holding that the county's letter was a request
for reconsideration, not a preclearance submission).
210. 603 F. Supp. 174, 177, 181-82 (N.D. Ala. 1985) (the Assistant Attorney General denied
§ 5 coverage and jurisdiction via letter to Alabama's Attorney General).
211. Voting Rights Act Hearings,supra note 66, at 67-68. The Administration endorsed only
a 10 year extension of preclearance conditional on a liberalized bailout, which would have allowed
many discriminatory jurisdictions to escape § 5 review. Id. at 70.
212. 50 Fed. Reg. 19,122 (1985) (codified at 28 C.F.R. §§ 51.1 to 51.67 (1988)). The regulations, first published in 1971, 36 Fed. Reg. 18,186 (1971), were revised on January 5, 1981, 46 Fed.
Reg. 870 (1981); 46 Fed. Reg. 9570 (1981). Further revision was necessary, according to the Attorney General, to conform the procedures to recent interpretations of § 5 contained in judicial decisions and the 1982 Voting Rights Act amendments. 28 C.F.R. § 51 (1988).
213. See Proposed Changes to Regulations Governing Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act:
Oversight HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the Comm. on the
Judiciary House of Representatives, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 43, 84, 166 (1985) [hereinafter Oversight Hearings] (testimony on behalf of American Civil Liberties Union, Joint Center for Political
Studies, League of Women Voters, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and
Texas Rural Legal Services).
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narrowed the scope of section 5 review of reapportionment plans developed as the result of litigation, allowed the implementation of unprecleared voting practices on the basis of "exigent circumstances,"
granted preclearance of discriminatory changes when the section 5 violation was "unavoidable," and suggested that a reapportionment plan
or an annexation would be objectionable only if the reduction of minority voting strength was "significant." 14
The House held oversight hearings on the revisions on November
13 and 20, 1985, and issued a report strongly critical of the proposed
changes. According to the House report, "the proposed regulations
would undermine the effective enforcement of the Voting Rights Act.
The proposed regulations abandon proven methods of success and
adopt new methods not sanctioned by the 1982 Amendments or by case
law. '215 As a result of the criticisms that emerged during the House
hearings and the receipt of comments from other interested parties, the
Attorney General removed most of the objectional features from the final version of the regulations issued on January 6, 1987.16
The most controversial of the proposals was section 51.56(c)(1),
which authorized an objection to a section 5 submission based on a violation of the results standard of section 2 only "if there is clear and
convincing evidence of such a violation" presented by "the party or parties alleging violations of the Section." Congress indicated in the legislative history that section 2 applied to section 5 preclearance in order to
correct Beer v. United States,2 17 which defined the "effect" language of
section 5 to mean only retrogression. According to the majority in Beer,
section 5 was designed to freeze voting practices and maintain the status quo. Thus, voting procedures free of racial purpose which did not
cause further harm to minorities were not objectionable under the effect test of section 5, no matter how unfair in their application. The
Senate report that accompanied the amendment, as well as its key
sponsors, made it clear that section 2 was to apply to section 5. Moreover, preclearance should be denied to a voting practice, even if not
retrogressive, if it had a discriminatory result or diluted minority voting
strength.2 1 This interpretation is consistent with the Attorney Gen214. For a more complete discussion of the legal basis for these criticisms, see Oversight
Hearings, supra note 213, at 2, 43, 84, 166 (prepared statements of Dorothy S. Ridings, Cynthia
Hill, Laughlin McDonald, Judith Sanders-Castro, Dianne Ross, and Frank R. Parker).
215. H.R. REP. SEP_ No. 9, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1986).
216. 28 C.F.R. § 51 (1988).
217. 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
218. See S. REP. No. 417, supra note 24, at 12 n.31, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE, supra note
24, at 189 n.31; 128 CONG. REc. 857,095 (daily ed. June 18, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy); 128
CONG. REC. H3841 (daily ed. June 23, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Sensenbrenner, agreed to by Rep.
Edwards). Section 2 would have its greatest potential application to submissions that did not show

MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS

1989]

1289

eral's established practice, known to Congress at the time of enactment
of the 1982 amendments, of denying preclearance changes which violated other provisions of the Act. The Attorney General, for example, in
the past had denied section 5 preclearance to changes which violated
section 2 as well as section 4(f)(4) of the Act, a provision requiring certain covered jurisdictions to implement bilingual voting procedures. 19
These are the only direct references in the legislative history. Nevertheless, opponents have argued that brief colloquies during the debate
in the House indicate that section 2 was not to apply to preclearance.220
As the House oversight committee concluded, however, these colloquies
did not address the question of whether section 2 applied to section 5,
but only to the more general issue of whether the preclearance requirement had been changed. The Edwards colloquies, therefore, confirm
that section 5 was not changed on its face, but do not address whether
section 2 standards apply to preclearance. 22 '
At the time of the colloquies the fourth and fifth congressional districts in the Atlanta area, represented by Representatives Elliot Levitas
and Wyche Fowler, were involved in section 5 litigation in the District
Court for the District of Columbia.222 The case, Busbee v. Smith,225
concerned whether the general assembly had fragmented the concentration of minority population in the metropolitan area to limit the number of blacks in the fifth district-or, in the words of the chairman of
the house reapportionment committee, to keep from drawing "a nigger
district.

'2 24

Given the options for reapportionment, a "blacker" fifth

district (an obvious concern to Fowler, a white Democrat) would mean a
"whiter," and more Republican, fourth district (an obvious concern to
Levitas, also a white Democrat). 22 The state argued, among other

things, that the reapportionment could not violate the effect, or retrogression, standard of section 5 since the proposed fifth district had a
retrogression either because it was absent or because it was difficult to measure, for example, when
a jurisdiction changed from direct appointments to elections at-large. See County Council of Sumter County v. United States, 596 F. Supp. 35, 38 (D.D.C. 1984).
219. H.R.REP. SER. No. 9, supra note 215, at 4; see Voting Rights Act Hearings,supra note
66, at 1659 (statement of William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights
Div.); see also 28 C.F.R. § 55.2(e) (1988). This interpretation also is consistent with the broad
construction of § 5 mandated by Congress and the courts and with the general remedial purposes
of the Act.
220. See Oversight Hearings,supra note 213, at 71 (prepared statement of Katharine I. Butler) (citing 128 CONG. REc. H3844-45 (daily ed. June 23, 1982) (remarks of Representatives Levitas,
Fowler, and Edwards)).
221. H.R. REP. SER. No. 9, supra note 215, at 4.
222. Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 459 U.S. 1166 (1983).
223. 549 F. Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1982), af'd, 459 U.S. 1166 (1983).
224. Id. at 501, 515.
225. Id. at 507.
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higher black population percentage (fifty-seven percent) than under the
existing plan (fifty percent). 226 As both Levitas and Fowler knew, the
adoption of a section 2 results standard for section 5 would have made
this argument academic. The court denied preclearance, reasoning that,
while the plan "technically . does not have a discriminatory effect,"
the state had failed to satisfy its burden that the plan was "nondiscriminatory in purpose. '227 Although the case was decided shortly after the
1982 amendments to the Act, the court did not discuss the application
of section 2 to preclearance.2 2 8
In light of Busbee, the cryptic Levitas-Fowler colloquies can be
best understood as reflecting the private concerns of two members of
Congress. They hardly represent the general understanding of the
House as a whole, much less that of the Senate. In any event, to the
extent that there is a conflict between the Senate report and the statements of key sponsors of the bill (Senator Edward Kennedy and Representative James Sensenbrenner) on the one hand, and Representatives
Fowler and Levitas on the other, normal rules of legislative construction
indicate that the former take precedence over the latter.2 '
The Attorney General, who had opposed the amendment of section
2, vacillated on whether, and how, to apply section 2 to preclearance. 3 0
In a section 5 case from Sumter County, South Carolina, concerning a
change from appointed county officials to officials elected at-large, the
Department took three different positions in three successive briefs. It
argued initially that to obtain preclearance a jurisdiction must establish
that a voting change does not violate section 2.231 Nine days later the
Department filed a substitute brief that deleted the section 2 argument
entirely. 23 2 Before the litigation was over the Department filed a third
brief arguing that section 2 applied to section 5, but that those oppos226. Id. at 498, 516.
227. Id. at 516, 518.
228. The state developed a second plan for a fifth district with a black population exceeding
65%. That plan was approved by the court. Id. at 520.
229. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-27 (1982) (stating that the
comments of legislation sponsors "are an authoritative guide to the statute's construction"); Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564 (1976); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168,
186 (1969) (stating that reports of standing committees represent "the considered and collective
understanding" of the drafters and are an acknowledged source for determining legislative intent);
NLRB v. Fruit Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964); American Jewish Congress v. Kreps, 574 F.2d 624,
629 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1978); American Airlines, v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 365 F.2d 939, 948-49 (D.C.
Cir. 1966) (stating that "reports by the legislative committees responsible for formulating the legislation must take precedence in event of conflict over statements in the legislative debates on the
floors of the houses of Congress").
230. See supra note 104.
231. U.S. Attorney General's Memorandum, Oct. 18, 1982, at 17-19, County Council of Sumter County v. United States, 596 F. Supp. 35 (D.D.C. 1984).
232. U.S. Attorney General's Memorandum, Oct. 27, 1982, Sumter County, 596 F. Supp. 35.
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ing preclearance (the United States or minority intervenors) had the
burden of establishing a prima facie violation of the statute. 33 The district court did not reach the section 2 issue but denied preclearance on
the grounds that Sumter County had not shown that the submission
2 34
was free of racial purpose or effect.
The third position taken in the Sumter County case was essentially
the one adopted by the Attorney General in the final version of the
section 5 guidelines issued in January 1987.35 The difficulties with the
Attorney General's position are that it shifts the burden of proof in section 5 submissions and lowers the standard for preclearance. The law of
section 5 prior to 1987 was that submitting jurisdictions had the burden
of proof.2 36 Under the new guidelines, those opposing preclearance on
section 2 grounds have the burden of proof. In addition, prior to 1987, if
the evidence of discriminatory purpose or effect was ambiguous,
preclearance would be denied. Under the new guidelines, if the evidence
of discriminatory results is ambiguous preclearance will be granted. The
guidelines thus lower the standard for preclearance and, contrary to the
intent of Congress, once again give state officials some of the advantage
of inertia and delay in enacting new voting practices.2 3 7
B. Affirmative Litigation: The Civil Rights Community Carries the
Load
The Department has been most neglectful in enforcing the Voting
Rights Act in the area of affirmative litigation, where it must exercise
initiative in instituting challenges to discriminatory practices. Between
1978 and 1988, a total of 2236 voting rights lawsuits were filed in the
233. U.S. Attorney General's Pre-Trial Brief, Jan. 24, 1983, at 74, Sumter County, 596 F.
Supp. 35. The Department later took yet another position-that § 2 did not apply to § 5 at all. At
a meeting of political scientists in Washington, D.C. in August 1986, the Assistant Attorney General announced that the Department no longer would object to submitted voting changes on the
basis of § 2 because "it would be too burdensome to consider discriminatory results in each
preclearance review." Kurtz, Justice Dept. Won't Assess Possible Bias in Election Plans, Wash.
Post, Aug. 30, 1986, at Al, col. 5, at A9, col. 1.
234. Sumter County, 596 F. Supp. at 39. The defendant-intervenors preclearance also raised
the application of § 2 to § 5 in Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1982), but the court
again did not reach the issue.
235. The final version, 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b)(2) (1988), provides that the Attorney General will
object to a submission under § 5 "to prevent a clear violation of amended Section 2." The regulations and the testimony of the Assistant Attorney General at the House oversight hearings provide
that those opposing preclearance on § 2 grounds have the burden of showing a violation of the
statute. See 28 C.F.R. § 51 (1988); Oversight Hearings, supra note 213, at 151.
236. McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 256 (1984) (stating that the adoption of a new election practice by a covered jurisdiction "raises, in effect, a statutory inference that the practice may
have been adopted for a discriminatory purpose or may have a discriminatory effect"); City of
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 183 & n.18 (1980).
237. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966).
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federal district courts. 3s The United States was named as a defendant
in seventy-nine of these suits involving section 5 preclearance and bail
out, and the Attorney General thus was required to defend them. Of the
remaining 2157 the United States was a plaintiff in only 105 (4.9 percent), including cases filed initially by private parties and in which the
United States was a plaintiff-intervenor.2 39 Private parties brought the
rest of the 2052 cases (95.1 percent).240 As is apparent, the civil rights
community, frequently opposed by the Department of Justice on such
critical issues as extension and amendment of the Act and the construction of the results standard, has borne the burden of modern voting
2 41
rights enforcement.
C. Incomplete Progress and the Need for Reform in Registration
Despite the undeniable progress, minorities clearly have not yet
achieved equality of political participation. In Alabama, for example,
blacks are 22.9 percent of the voting age population, but only about ten
percent of elected officials. In Mississippi, which has the largest black
voting age population (thirty-one percent) and the largest number of
black elected officials (578) of any state, blacks are only ten percent of
the total number of elected officeholders.2 4 Nationally, blacks comprise
eleven percent of the population but hold fewer than 1.5 percent of
elected offices. 43 Hispanics are seven percent of the population but less
than one percent of office holders, while the population-percent ratio of
238.
239.

1979-1988 ANNUAL COURT REPORT, supra note 175, table C-2.
The United States was a plaintiff-intervenor in six cases begun after January 20, 1981.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, VOTING CASES AT DISTRICT COURT LEVEL IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES'

20, 1981.
240. Id.
241. Most of the private litigation has been initiated, or supported, by such civil rights organizations as the American Civil Liberties Union, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law,
Legal Defense Fund, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and Southwest
Voter Registration Education Project. Other groups active in voting rights enforcement include the
Center for Constitutional Rights, League of Women Voters, Legal Services Corporation, NAACP,
National Indian Youth Council, Native American Rights Fund, Puerto Rican Legal Defense Fund,
Southern Poverty Law Center, Southern Regional Council and Voter Education Project. Despite
the considerably greater resources of the Department of Justice (the Civil Rights Division alone
has 400 employees), many of the individual civil rights organizations have brought more voting
rights lawsuits than the federal government. During the period from 1982 to 1988, for example, the
southern regional office of the ACLU, with three or four lawyers and a limited budget, filed more
than 80 voting cases in federal district court, compared with 67 filed by the Department of Justice.
PARTICIPATION BEGAN AFTER JANUARY

ACLU

SOUTHERN REGIONAL OFFICE, ANNUAL

DocKETs (1982-1988). The Southwest Voter Registra-

tion Education Project, another comparatively small civil rights organization in San Antonio,
brought the same number of voting rights cases as the Department of Justice in 1981 (eight) and
more cases than the Department in 1982 (six as opposed to four) and in 1983 (eight as opposed to
one). SOUTHWEST VOTER REGISTRATION EDUCATION PROJECT, DocKET.
242. 17 NAT'L ROSTER, supra note 9.
243. 15 id. at 1.
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2 44
Indians to Indian office holders is similarly low.
Registration and turnout statistics, which are depressed for all voters, also show racial disparities. According to the Census Bureau/CPS
estimates, 69.6 percent of whites, 66.3 percent of blacks, and 40.1 percent of Hispanics of voting age were registered to vote in 1984. On the
day of the 1984 Presidential election, an estimated 61.4 percent of
whites, 55.8 of blacks, and 32.6 percent of Hispanics of voting age cast
ballots. 4 5 The estimates for 1986 showed the rates of registration remaining fairly constant, but an even lower turnout rate-for whites
forty-seven percent, for blacks forty-three percent, and for Hispanics
only twenty-four percent.2 6 The turnout for the 1988 Presidential election was also low, lower than at any time since 1942, and the third lowest in our history. According to CBS News estimates, only 49.1 percent
of voting age Americans voted in the last Presidential election. 4 7
Numerous studies have concluded that these low levels of voter
participation, which are at the bottom in comparison with the world's
other major democratic nations, 248 are the result, in part, of the country's needlessly complex, state-by-state system which places the burden
of registration on the voter. 24 9 The studies also conclude that burden-

244. NALEO REPORT, supra note 10.
245. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN
THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 1984, at 7 (1985).
246. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN
THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 1986, at 25 (1987).
247. CBS News Poll, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1988, at B6, col. 1; see Republicans Push "Hot
Button" Issues, 16 S. EXPOSURE, Winter 1988, at 5, 7; see also COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF THE
AMERICAN ELECTORATE, CREATING THE OPPORTUNITY 3 (1988) [hereinafter CREATING THE OPPORTUNITY]; F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, supra note 12, at 161.
248. Harvard/ABC Symposium (1984:7), in F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, supra note 12, at 19. On
a list of 24 of these nations, the United States ranks next-to-last in voter turnout, only slightly
ahead of Switzerland.
249. CITIZENS COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BARRIERS TO REGISTRATION AND VOTING 8-11, 53-115;
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECRETARIES OF STATE, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON BARRIERS TO VOT-

iii (1987); F. PETERS & R. JACKS, STATES ADVANCE VOTER REGISTRATION REFORMS, at i, 44
(Nat'l Center for Pol'y Alternatives 1987); F. PIEN & R CLOWARD, supra note 12, at 17-18, 25, 209,
244-47; Boyd, Decline in U.S. Voter Turnout:StructuralExplanations, 16 AM. POL. Q., April 1988,
at 9; Burnham, The Appearance and Disappearanceof the American Voter, in THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE AMERICAN VOTER (1979). The United States is virtually alone among democracies in
requiring a two-step process in which voters must register, usually at specially designated sites,
prior to casting a ballot. In other countries, the state generally prepares the voter list and all the
citizen needs to do is vote. Crewe, Electoral Participation,in DEMOCRACY AT THE POLLS (D. Butler,
H. Penniman & A. Ranney eds. 1981). There are other reasons unrelated to registration laws why
voter participation in the United States is lower than other democracies. The introduction of 18-20
year olds (who are notoriously sluggish voter participants) to the pool of eligible voters, disenchantment with government, weakened party structures, and alienation are other possible causes
of low voting in the United States. Stronger or more homogeneous political parties, fewer elections,
and less complex systems of government are causes of higher voting in other countries. Boyd,
supra, at 143, 153-54.
ING, at
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some registration procedures have a disproportionate impact on minorities and the poor.25 0
As the post-Reconstruction experience in the South so vividly demonstrates, and as the Democratic "redeemers" so clearly understood,
there is a strong correlation between complex registration procedures
and low minority voter participation. In Mississippi in 1867, seventy
percent of the state's black population was registered to vote. By 1899,
after the state's adoption of a literacy test, a poll tax and a residency
requirement for voting, all but nine percent of blacks were removed
from the electorate.25 1 Other southern states adopted similar restrictive
registration laws and in all of them voter registration and participation
by minorities declined dramatically.2 52 Conversely, as the experience of
abolition of literacy tests in 1965 demonstrates, the easing of restrictions on voter registration enhances both registration and voting.
One study has estimated that voter participation in the United
States would increase by 9.1 percent if all barriers to registration were
removed and all the voter had to do was vote.253 Other studies have set
the increase at a lower level, but all agree that easing restrictions on
registration would have a positive impact on the level of voter participation, even during a period of high voter disaffection from the political
process.2 54
The conclusions reached by these studies of registration procedures
are supported by the findings of the district court in Mississippi State
Chapter, Operation PUSH v. Allain."5 Operation PUSH invalidated
two provisions of state law. The first modified, but failed to eliminate,
the state's "dual registration" requirement; the second prohibited
county registrars from removing the voter registration books from the
county courthouse to register voters without the permission of the
county board of supervisors. The court found that black registration
was approximately twenty-five percentage points below that of white,
that the challenged practices were enacted for a discriminatory purpose,
and that the practices "have a discriminatory result and deny black
250. Boyd, supra note 249, at 143, 153-54; see also Stone, Voter Registration Context and
Results, 17 URB. LAW. 519, 522-23 (1985).
251. United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 132 (1965).
252. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, supra note 8,at 8; see also sources cited supra note 5.
253. Rosenstone & Wolfinger, The Effects of Registration Laws on Voter Turnout, 72 AM.
POL. SCL REV. 22, 41 (1978).
254. See CREATING THE OPPORTUNITY, supra note 247, at 6 (estimating that if election day
registration were adopted voter turnout might increase in the United States by more than six
million voters in four years). Other measures which could increase voter registration and turnout
include increasing the number of deputy registrars, allowing registration at government agencies,
door-to-door and mail-in registration, and decreasing the frequency of purges for nonvoting.
255. 674 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. Miss. 1987).
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voters equal access to the political process. 2 56 The court expressly
found that barriers to voter registration were the main reason for low
turnout rates in the state. 7 The opinion outlined the kind of relief that
would cure the violations but allowed the state time to propose a remedial plan.
Decisions like OperationPUSH,258 and declining, racially disparate
voter participation rates, underscore the need for reform of the Nation's
voter registration system, including the establishment of federal standards for mail-in, agency based, volunteer, and election day registration.259 Not surprisingly, the states with the most liberal registration
laws and which permit election day registration were among those with
the highest turnout rates in the 1988 Presidential election. Minnesota
was first with 65.4 percent of the voting age population going to the
polls, Wisconsin was second with 61.9 percent and Maine was fourth
with 61 percent. North Dakota was sixth with a rate of 59.6 percent. 2 0
Bills incorporating many of the reforms discussed above have been
introduced in Congress at various times but have not been enacted into
law.2 s ' Universal voter registration, however, is an idea whose time has
256. Id. at 1252.
257. Id. at 1256 (stating that "[d]ifficulty in registration is the main reason for not voting").
258. Numerous other cases illustrate how needlessly restrictive and discriminatory in effect
are the registration procedures used in many states. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330
(1972) (holding unconstitutional one year durational residency requirement); Beare v. Briscoe, 498
F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1974) (invalidating a Texas statute requiring annual voter registration during a
restrictive four month period); Project VOTE! v. Ledbetter, Civ. No. C86-1946A (N.D. Ga. Sept.
12, 1986) (consent decree striking down a state's refusal to allow registration at food stamp distribution centers); Windy Boy v. County of Big Horn, 647 F. Supp. 1002, 1008 (D. Mont. 1986)
(describing the arbitrary use of registration procedures by local officials to discourage or prevent
Indians from voting); Connecticut Citizens Action Group v. Pugliese, Civ. No. N84-431, slip op. (D.
Conn. Aug. 19, 1985) (invalidating a registrar's refusal to deputize volunteers); Spalding County
VEP v. Cowart, Civ. No. 3-84-CV-79 (N.D. Ga. June 3, 1985) (consent decree allowing registration
at sites in the black community); Project VOTE! v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Serv., 578 F.
Supp. 7 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (enjoining state from refusing to allow voter registration activity at employment office); NAACP, DeKalb County v. Georgia, 494 F. Supp. 668 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (enjoining
under § 5 the disallowance by local officials of neighborhood voter registration drives). See also
Williams, Current Litigation Challenging Voter Registration Procedures, in T. PIvN & R.
CLOWARD, supra note 12, at 272-90 app. D.
259. None of these proposals is radical or untested. Twenty-four states and the District of
Columbia currently provide for registration by mail. Sixteen states allow government and private
agencies to register voters. Three states, Maine, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, permit election day
registration, and one state, North Dakota, has no voter registration at all. These states, moreover,
have not reported any increase or additional problems in fraudulent registration or voting.
260. CBS News Poll, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1988, at B6, col. 1.
261. An election day registration bill was introduced in Congress in 1977 during the Carter
Administration. According to the former President, the bill was defeated because "[i]ncumbent
members of the Congress don't want to see additional unpredictable voters registered. . . . [Tihis
is the single most important obstacle to increasing participation on election day." Harvard/ABC
News Symposium (1984:18), quoted in F. PIvN & R CLOWARD, supra note 12, at 215. More recently Senator Alan Cranston (D.-Calif.) introduced a bill in the Senate requiring the states to
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come and will continue to be a civil rights priority. It may not ensure
one hundred percent voter turnout, but it will certainly help stop the
decline in voter participation and remove unnecessary and unjustifiable
barriers to registration and voting.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Voting Rights Act continues to demonstrate its great value in
guiding us toward the pluralism and political equality envisioned by the
post-Civil War constitutional amendments. But we are still far from being a truly integrated society or one in which race is no longer a dominant factor. That is apparent from the chronic levels of bloc voting that
are still documented in modern voting cases and the fact that minorities have gained election principally in districts where members of their
own race were in the majority. If racial bloc voting remains a constant,
and if single member districts remain the only alternative to at-large
voting, the number of available minority districts will represent the
practical upper limit on the ability of minorities to elect representatives
of their choice. Continued progress, therefore, will depend on the development of additional, more effective remedies for vote dilution. It also
will depend on the ability of minority candidates to establish coalitions
with white voters and on the elimination of racial fear and polarization
in the electorate.

provide for registration by mail, at government agencies that serve the public directly, at private
agencies that volunteer to register voters and at polling places on the day of election. S. 2061,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). A similar bill was introduced in the House by Representative John
Conyers (D.-Mich.). H.R. 3950, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
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APPENDIX

Voting Cases Filed in U.S. District Court, 1978 - 1988*
Year

Total

1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Totals:

U.S. P1.

U.S. Def.

Private P1.

139
145

11
13

5
7

160
152
170
175

6
8
4
1

7
9
11
6

123
125
147
135
155
240

259
281
194
214
347

10
17

9
5

240
259

12
12
11

4
7
9

178
195
327

2,236

105

79

2,052

* Source: Annual Reports of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
Table C 2, U.S. District Courts, Civil Cases Commenced, by Basis of Jurisdiction and Nature of
Suit, June 30, 1978 - June 30, 1988.

